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CONSPIRACY TO ARBITRATE* 
CHRISTOPHER R. LESLIE** 
 
Beginning in the 1980s, the Supreme Court has ushered in 
a new Age of Arbitration in which firms can use 
arbitration clauses to include otherwise unenforceable 
terms in their contracts. This has allowed defendants to 
shorten statutes of limitations, to limit damages, and to 
prevent injunctive remedies altogether. Given the pro-
business nature of arbitration clauses, mandatory 
arbitration clauses have become standard in some 
industries. Some industries may transition to market-wide 
mandatory arbitration, in part, through conspiracies to 
arbitrate. A conspiracy to arbitrate exists when the 
competing firms in a market illegally agree that they will 
all impose mandatory arbitration on their consumers.  
 
This Article highlights the dangers of conspiracies to 
impose arbitration, their illegality, and their utility in 
concealing and protecting price-fixing conspiracies. 
Despite the fact that conspiracies to arbitrate violate 
antitrust law, courts have misapplied arbitration law in 
ways that make such conspiracies profitable and perhaps 
inevitable in some markets. Relying on the false premise 
that Congress created a federal policy favoring 
arbitration, federal courts have employed seemingly 
neutral doctrines in ways that actively implement 
conspiracies to arbitrate. For example, courts have 
compelled antitrust plaintiffs to arbitrate their claims that 
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defendants have conspired to impose arbitration, which 
means courts are enforcing—instead of condemning—the 
very agreement among competitors that they are supposed 
to adjudicate. Courts have also misapplied equitable 
doctrines and have given retroactive effect to arbitration 
clauses. These judicial decisions protect both conspiracies 
to arbitrate and price-fixing cartels.  
 
The Article then presents a case study of recent litigation 
involving an alleged conspiracy among banks that issue 
credit cards to impose arbitration clauses on their 
customers. Following a bench trial, the federal trial judge 
held—and the Second Circuit affirmed—that the plaintiffs 
failed to prove an agreement among the defendants to 
impose arbitration clauses. In reaching this conclusion, 
the court committed a litany of mistakes and ultimately 
failed to recognize that it did, in fact, actually find an 
illegal conspiracy to arbitrate. These errors flowed from 
the court’s incorrect belief that Congress intended courts 
to favor arbitration over litigation.  
 
The Article concludes by proposing changes to the way 
that courts evaluate conspiracy-to-arbitrate claims. 
Federal courts are essentially complicit in antitrust 
violations when they compel compliance with arbitration 
clauses that are the product of alleged illegal conspiracies. 
The Supreme Court’s rush to encourage and enforce 
arbitration clauses should not blind lower courts to the 
possibility that conspiracies to arbitrate are preventing the 




INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 383 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF BINDING ARBITRATION ................................ 387 
A. From Commercial Disputes to Consumer Contracts ......... 387 
B. The Growth of Pro-Defendant Arbitration Clauses in 
Consumer Contracts .............................................................. 392 
1.  Pro-Defendant Process .................................................... 393 
2.  Pro-Defendant Terms ...................................................... 395 
96 N.C. L. REV. 381 (2018) 
2017] CONSPIRACY TO ARBITRATE 383 
II.  CONSPIRACIES TO ARBITRATE ....................................................... 400 
A. The Illegality of Early Efforts to Impose Arbitration 
Through Collusion ................................................................ 401 
B. Conspiracy to Arbitrate as a Primary Conspiracy .............. 406 
1.  The Motive to Conspire to Arbitrate ............................. 407 
2.  Harms of a Primary Conspiracy to Arbitrate ................ 410 
C. Conspiracy to Arbitrate as a Secondary Conspiracy .......... 412 
1.  Concealing an Underlying Conspiracy .......................... 412 
2.  Undermining Pro-Plaintiff Aspects of Antitrust 
Law .................................................................................... 413 
3.  Alleviating Settlement Pressure ..................................... 419 
4.  Adding a Net Beneficial, Relatively Minor 
Conspiracy ........................................................................ 422 
5.  Summary ............................................................................ 423 
III.  JUDICIAL FACILITATION OF CONSPIRACIES TO ARBITRATE .... 423 
A. Supreme Court Arbitration Jurisprudence as the 
Catalyst for Conspiracies to Arbitrate ................................. 424 
B. Judicial Enforcement of Conspiracies to Arbitrate ............ 425 
C. Judicial Misuse of Equitable Doctrines to Enforce 
Conspiracies to Arbitrate ...................................................... 428 
D. Giving Retroactive Effect to Arbitration Clauses in 
Antitrust Disputes .................................................................. 433 
IV.  A CASE STUDY IN JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF CONSPIRACIES 
TO ARBITRATE ............................................................................. 435 
A. Factual Background .............................................................. 435 
B. Judicial Mistakes .................................................................... 440 
C. Inappropriate Deference to Arbitration ............................... 448 
V.  MOVING FORWARD .......................................................................... 451 
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................... 454 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Beginning in the 1980s, the Supreme Court has ushered in a new 
Age of Arbitration. Based on its assertion that Congress—when 
enacting the 1925 Federal Arbitration Act—created a federal policy 
favoring arbitration, the Court has issued a series of opinions that 
make statutory claims subject to private arbitration. In the 2010s, the 
Court expanded on its pro-arbitration jurisprudence and upheld the 
enforceability of arbitration clauses in consumer contracts, even when 
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those clauses were held unconscionable under applicable state law.1 
The Court also permitted businesses to insert class-action waivers into 
their arbitration clauses, thus preventing victims of illegal activity 
from participating in class-action litigation.2 The growing judicial 
deference to arbitration clauses has provided firms the ability to 
include otherwise unenforceable terms in their contracts, which may 
allow defendants to shorten statutes of limitations, to limit damages, 
and to prevent injunctive remedies altogether.3 Given the pro-
business nature of arbitration clauses, mandatory arbitration clauses 
have become standard in some industries. If mandatory arbitration 
becomes the norm in a particular market, through individual firms 
each deciding independently to impose arbitration clauses, then the 
antitrust rules against collusion are not implicated.4 
Some industries, however, may transition to market-wide 
mandatory arbitration, in part, through conspiracies to arbitrate. A 
conspiracy to arbitrate exists when the competing firms in a market 
illegally agree that they will all impose mandatory arbitration on their 
consumers. This Article explains how the Supreme Court’s relatively 
recent arbitration opinions have converted arbitration clauses into a 
mechanism that firms can use to insulate themselves from liability for 
their illegal conduct. As a result, the Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration 
jurisprudence encourages and protects conspiracies to arbitrate. 
This Article highlights the dangers of conspiracies to arbitrate. 
Such conspiracies magnify all of the worst aspects of mandatory 
arbitration by leaving consumers with little or no meaningful ability 
to avoid relinquishing their rights to litigate in state and federal 
courts. When all of the suppliers in a particular market require their 
customers to submit to arbitration, consumers cannot purchase the 
needed product or service without surrendering their rights. 
Identifying the anticompetitive harms of conspiracies to arbitrate 
over eighty-five years ago, the Supreme Court condemned such 
 
 1. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011) (finding 
that the Federal Arbitration Act preempted the California law that treated class-action 
waivers in arbitration clauses as unconscionable). 
 2. See generally Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) 
(holding that the FAA does not allow courts to invalidate class-action waivers based on 
fact that the cost of individual arbitrations exceeds the plaintiff’s potential recovery). 
 3. Christopher R. Leslie, The Arbitration Bootstrap, 94 TEX. L. REV. 265, 282–92 
(2015). 
 4. See Kartell v. Blue Shield of Mass., Inc., 749 F.2d 922, 930 (1st Cir. 1984) (Breyer, 
J.) (“Competitors cannot agree, for example, to insist that their contracts .	.	. contain 
arbitration clauses, even though each individual competitor can make up his own mind to 
insist upon such a term in any, or all, of his contracts.”). 
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conspiracies as per se violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.5 If a 
market transitions to industry-wide arbitration as a result of 
independent decisions by each firm in the market, that may be tragic 
but not necessarily illegal. Section 1 of the Sherman Act condemns 
only agreements in restraint of trade, not unilateral decision-making. 
When, however, industry-wide arbitration results from an agreement 
among competing firms to make mandatory arbitration the industry 
standard, the agreement violates antitrust law. Unfortunately, as this 
Article details, courts as of late have been more focused on protecting 
the conspirators than on protecting consumers. 
This Article explores how courts have developed a body of law 
that encourages and rewards firms that conspire to impose arbitration 
clauses on their customers. Most of these judgments are driven by the 
incorrect belief that Congress intended to create an overarching 
policy that reveres arbitration over litigation. This Article argues for 
courts to treat conspiracies to arbitrate as per se illegal, to interpret 
equitable and legal doctrines in a manner that discourages instead of 
enables such conspiracies, and to not let the so-called federal policy in 
favor of arbitration affect their decisions in conspiracy-to-arbitrate 
cases. 
Part I of this Article discusses the evolution of arbitration from a 
method of settling inter-merchant disputes to a mechanism that 
businesses use to prevent their customers from pursuing claims 
altogether. The Supreme Court’s strong endorsement of arbitration 
clauses has affected not merely the number, but also the content, of 
these provisions in consumer contracts. Today, many businesses 
structure their arbitration clauses to void many pro-consumer aspects 
of otherwise applicable law, such as long statutes of limitations and 
damage multipliers for successful plaintiffs. Used in this fashion, 
arbitration undermines consumer law and antitrust law. 
Recognizing that mandatory arbitration clauses are ubiquitous in 
many industries, Part II hypothesizes that one reason for the 
expansion might be collusion among competitors. The Supreme Court 
first discussed conspiracies to impose arbitration clauses in 1930 in 
Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States,6 which condemned 
a conspiracy to arbitrate implemented by motion picture distributors 
on movie theaters.7 The Court’s language indicates that conspiracies 
to impose arbitration clauses are per se illegal. Since that opinion 
 
 5. See Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 43 (1930). 
 6. 282 U.S. 30 (1930). 
 7. Id. at 43. 
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came down, no scholarship has analyzed the issue of conspiracies to 
arbitrate. 
Part II then presents a typology of conspiracies to arbitrate. Such 
conspiracies can be primary conspiracies: that is, stand-alone 
conspiracies untethered to any other illegal agreements among the 
conspirators. Alternatively, a conspiracy to arbitrate can be a 
secondary conspiracy when it is part of a larger antitrust conspiracy. 
In this latter scenario, rivals in a market have already decided to 
violate antitrust laws, for example, by fixing price. The agreement to 
fix price is the primary conspiracy; the conspiracy to arbitrate is a 
secondary conspiracy designed to conceal and protect the primary 
conspiracy. Part II explains how both primary and secondary 
conspiracies to arbitrate violate antitrust law. 
Part III explores how courts have misapplied arbitration law in 
ways that make conspiracies to arbitrate profitable and perhaps 
inevitable in some markets. Prior to the Supreme Court’s pro-
arbitration decisions, firms had little reason to conspire to impose 
arbitration clauses on their customers. Now, relying on the false 
premise that Congress created a federal policy favoring arbitration, 
federal courts have employed seemingly neutral doctrines in ways 
that actively enforce conspiracies to arbitrate. For example, courts 
have compelled antitrust plaintiffs to arbitrate their conspiracy-to-
arbitrate claims, which means courts are enforcing—instead of 
condemning—the very conspiracy that they are supposed to 
adjudicate.8 Courts have also misapplied equitable doctrines and have 
given retroactive effect to arbitration clauses.9 These judicial 
decisions protect both conspiracies to arbitrate and price-fixing 
cartels. Part III shows how all of these opinions flow from a 
misreading of congressional intent regarding arbitration. 
Part IV presents a case study of recent litigation involving an 
alleged conspiracy to arbitrate among banks that issue credit cards. 
Following a bench trial, a federal judge held, and the Second Circuit 
affirmed, that the plaintiffs failed to prove an agreement among the 
defendants to impose arbitration clauses.10 In reaching this 
conclusion, the court committed a litany of mistakes and ultimately 
failed to recognize that it did, in fact, actually find an illegal 
conspiracy to arbitrate. This Part explains how these errors flowed 
 
 8. See infra Section III.B. 
 9. See infra Section III.C, III.D. 
 10. Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d sub nom., 
Ross v. Citigroup, Inc., 630 F. App’x 79 (2d Cir. 2015). 
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from the court’s incorrect belief that Congress intended courts to 
favor arbitration over litigation. 
Part V proposes changes to how courts evaluate conspiracy-to-
arbitrate claims. Federal courts are essentially complicit in antitrust 
violations when they compel compliance with arbitration clauses that 
are the product of alleged conspiracies. The Supreme Court’s rush to 
encourage and enforce arbitration clauses should not blind lower 
courts to the possibility that conspiracies to arbitrate are preventing 
the free market from operating properly to protect consumer 
interests. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF BINDING ARBITRATION 
A. From Commercial Disputes to Consumer Contracts 
The roots of arbitration lie in commercial disputes between 
merchants, not disputes involving consumers. Arbitration of business 
disputes is older than the nation itself.11 Until the early twentieth 
century, however, pre-dispute agreements to arbitrate were not 
binding because either party could “repudiate arbitration agreements 
at any time before the arbitrator’s award was made.”12 The old system 
of private arbitration needed courts to enforce both the agreements 
to arbitrate and the decisions of arbitrators—actions that American 
judges were loath to take because they adhered to the English rule 
that “traditionally considered irrevocable arbitration agreements as 
‘ousting’ the courts of jurisdiction” and, thus, unenforceable.13 
American courts followed the English rule with vigor until 
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) in 1925.14 
The core of the FAA—section 2—states that if a commercial contract 
provides for private arbitration to settle any contract disputes, then 
the promise to arbitrate “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation 
of any contract.”15 The FAA was drafted and championed by business 
groups, primarily in New York, that wanted to resolve their inter-
merchant disputes through private arbitration rather than public 
 
 11. James E. Berger & Charlene Sun, The Evolution of Judicial Review Under the 
Federal Arbitration Act, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 745, 747 (2009). 
 12. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 32 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 13. Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510 n.4 (1974); see, e.g., Home Ins. 
Co. of N.Y. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 451 (1874). 
 14. United States Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, ch. 213, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) 
(codified at 9 U.S.C. §	2 (2012)). 
 15. 9 U.S.C. §	2 (2012). 
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litigation.16 All of the congressional testimony, hearings, and reports 
demonstrate that the FAA applied only to commercial disputes 
between merchants.17 As enacted, the FAA was a relatively modest 
law that allowed merchants to agree in advance to settle their trade 
disputes through arbitration. Congress never intended the FAA to 
apply to consumer contracts or to create any federal policy in favor of 
arbitration.18 Nor did Congress intend the FAA to apply to 
employment contracts.19 
 
 16. Leslie, supra note 3, at 302–06. 
 17. See, e.g., Sales and Contracts to Sell in Interstate and Foreign Commerce, and Fed. 
Commercial Arbitration: Hearing on S. 4213 and S. 4214 Before Subcomm. of S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 10 (1923) (statement of W. H. H. Piatt, Chairman of the Comm. 
of Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, ABA) [hereinafter Arbitration Hearings] 
(providing that the FAA applies to disputes involving “a contract between merchants one 
with another, buying and selling goods” (emphasis added)). 
 18. Craft v. Campbell Soup Co., 177 F.3d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir. 1998) (“Specifically, the 
legislative history demonstrates that the Act’s purpose was solely to bind merchants who 
were involved in commercial dealings.”), abrogated by Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 
532 U.S. 105 (2001); IMRE STEPHEN SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE: THE RISE OF 
MODERN ARBITRATION LAWS IN AMERICA 192–98 (2013) [hereinafter SZALAI, 
OUTSOURCING JUSTICE]; Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. 
L. REV. 81, 117 (1992) (noting that the writings of the drafter of—and moving force 
behind—the FAA “reveal[] an intent to devise a remedy entirely for commercial disputes 
.	.	. between ‘merchants’”); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and Arbitration: The Case 
Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements Between Employers and 
Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449, 467 (1996) (“The unrebutted legislative history 
created prior to the FAA’s passage establishes that only disputes arising out of 
commercial contracts were to be arbitrable; no agreements to arbitrate employment 
disputes in any industry were to be included.”); Margaret L. Moses, Statutory 
Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never 
Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 106–08 (2006) (arguing that legislative 
hearings of the FAA “make clear that the focus of the Act was merchant-to-merchant 
arbitrations, never merchant-to-consumer arbitrations”); David S. Schwartz, Enforcing 
Small Print to Protect Big Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of 
Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 75–81 (1997) (analyzing legislative history of 
FAA and concluding “that enforcement of arbitration clauses was intended to remain 
within the sphere of the commercial paradigm” of contracts between merchants); Jean R. 
Sternlight, Compelling Arbitration of Claims Under the Civil Rights Act of 1866: What 
Congress Could Not Have Intended, 47 U. KAN. L. REV. 273, 310 (1999) (“When Congress 
passed the FAA in 1925, it did not intend to allow employers or sellers of goods or services 
to require employees or consumers of such goods or services to resolve civil rights disputes 
through arbitration rather than in court. Nothing in the wording of the statute or in its 
legislative history supports such an interpretation.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping 
Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1636 (2005) (noting that “to the 
limited extent that the possibility of [business-consumer or employer-employee] 
arbitration was considered by Congress in 1925, when it passed the FAA, those few who 
spoke on the issue made clear that they did not view such a use of arbitration as 
appropriate”); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Rustic Justice: Community and Coercion 
Under the Federal Arbitration Act, 77 N.C. L. REV. 931, 992 (1999) (“In the 1920s, most 
supporters of the FAA and the state arbitration laws intended the new statutes to apply to 
disputes between members of the same trade association or between participants in a 
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After Congress enacted the FAA, federal courts initially obeyed 
Congress’s intent and continued to disallow binding arbitration in 
most contexts. For example, during the mid-twentieth century, the 
Supreme Court held that pre-dispute arbitration clauses could not 
reach federal statutory claims, such as securities fraud.20 The non-
arbitrability of federal statutory claims extended to antitrust law. 
Most famously, the Second Circuit in American Safety Equipment 
Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co.21 held that pre-dispute arbitration 
agreements could not cover antitrust claims, which had to be decided 
by federal judges.22 The Second Circuit reasoned, in part, that 
antitrust law served the public interest and that private arbitration 
could reduce plaintiffs’ incentives to investigate and pursue antitrust 
 
common line of business.”); Imre Stephen Szalai, Correcting a Flaw in the Arbitration 
Fairness Act, 2013 J. DISP. RESOL. 271, 278 (2013) [hereinafter Szalai, Correcting a Flaw] 
(explaining why “the FAA was not intended to cover consumer disputes”). 
 19. Although this Article focuses mainly on arbitration clauses in the context of 
consumer contracts, the arguments also apply to employment contracts. Many employers 
require their employees to submit to mandatory arbitration as a condition of employment. 
These contract terms fundamentally undermine the rights of workers. 
  Agreements among employers to force arbitration clauses on their respective 
employees would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act. Cf. Beltran v. InterExchange, Inc., 
176 F. Supp. 3d 1066, 1079 (D. Colo. 2016) (finding alleged agreement to suppress au pair 
wages would violate section 1 of the Sherman Act); In re High-Tech Emp. Antitrust Litig., 
856 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1123 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (holding no-poaching agreements among 
employers violate antitrust law). Some courts do not seem to fully appreciate this. See, e.g., 
Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 353 (2d Cir. 1978) (“[T]he contention that an agreement 
among competitors to insist on arbitration clauses in contracts with a category of 
employees violates the antitrust law seems surprising.”). 
  The mistakes in the employee-arbitration context flow from the Supreme Court 
holding that employment disputes are subject to mandatory arbitration. Circuit City 
Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001). Such decisions are wrong as a matter of 
legislative history because Congress did not intend the FAA to apply to employment 
contracts. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 40 (1991) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (“[T]he FAA specifically was intended to exclude arbitration agreements 
between employees and employers.”); Szalai, Correcting a Flaw, supra note 18, at 277 
(“The text of the FAA, its legislative history, and the history behind its enactment, clearly 
reveal that the FAA was intended to facilitate the arbitration of commercial disputes 
between merchants, and that labor or employment disputes were expressly removed from 
the purview of the FAA.”); see also SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE, supra note 18, at 
191 (“In light of the history of the arbitration reform movement, the Circuit City decision 
is fundamentally flawed.”). 
 20. Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. 
Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 21. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968). 
 22. Id. at 827–28. 
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actions.23 The American Safety doctrine proved influential nationally, 
and antitrust claims were generally considered to be non-arbitrable.24 
In the 1980s, the Supreme Court reimagined a different 
legislative intent behind the FAA, which the Court claimed had 
created an “emphatic federal policy in favor of arbitral dispute 
resolution,”25 pursuant to which “questions of arbitrability must be 
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring 
arbitration.”26 In 1983, the Court asserted that “[t]he Arbitration Act 
establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any doubts concerning the 
scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration 
. . . .”27 As a result of this Court-driven expansion of the FAA, 
antitrust claims, federal securities fraud claims, and RICO claims 
could be decided in private arbitration,28 despite the public interest at 
stake. 
As the Court initially expanded the reach of arbitration clauses, 
consumers could invoke two legal doctrines to prevent being forced 
to arbitrate. First, the unconscionability doctrine makes 
unconscionable contracts—and unconscionable contract terms—
unenforceable. Although unconscionability is a function of state law, 
the FAA provides that federal courts should not enforce arbitration 
agreements that violate applicable state law, such as the 
unconscionability doctrine.29 Second, when an arbitration clause 
covers federal statutory rights, the Effective Vindication Doctrine 
provides that the “arbitration of the claim will not be compelled if the 
prospective litigant cannot effectively vindicate his statutory rights in 
the arbitral forum.”30 When the Supreme Court first held that federal 
antitrust claims were subject to private arbitration, the justices 
articulated the Effective Vindication Doctrine as a means to ensure 
that the statutory rights of antitrust plaintiffs were still protected 
because “so long as the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate 
its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will 
 
 23. Id. 
 24. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 620–21 
(1985). 
 25. Id. at 631. 
 26. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). 
 27. Id. at 24–25; see also Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 627 (“[T]he congressional policy 
manifested in the Federal Arbitration Act .	.	. requires courts liberally to construe the 
scope of arbitration agreements covered by that Act .	.	.	.”). 
 28. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 242 (1987) (RICO claims); 
Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636 (antitrust claims); Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 
213, 223 (1985) (securities claims). 
 29. See 9 U.S.C. §	2 (2012). 
 30. In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 282 (4th Cir. 2007). 
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continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function.”31 Thus, 
the Court permitted statutory claims to be removed from public 
courts only because it assumed plaintiffs could still effectively 
vindicate their rights in private arbitration.32 
The Supreme Court, however, has effectively eliminated both of 
these pro-consumer doctrines—the unconscionability defense and the 
Effective Vindication Doctrine—when an arbitration clause includes 
a class-action waiver. A class-action waiver requires would-be 
plaintiffs to neither bring nor participate in class-action litigation 
against the business with whom the customers entered the contract. 
Through contracts of adhesion, firms can use arbitration clauses to 
impose class-action waivers on their customers. Because individual 
actions may be economically infeasible, these class-action waivers can 
effectively immunize wrongdoers from scrutiny altogether when the 
cost of pursuing individual action exceeds the maximum potential 
damage award.33 In this situation, no victim will bring even a 
meritorious claim that is certain to win, and the law-breaking firm 
gets to keep all of its ill-gotten gains. Given the effects of class-action 
waivers, a strong argument can be made that arbitration clauses that 
include class-action waivers are unconscionable and violate the 
Effective Vindication Doctrine. 
Instead, the Supreme Court has held that the Court-created 
presumption in favor of enforcing arbitration clauses trumps both of 
these pro-consumer legal doctrines. In AT&T v. Concepcion,34 the 
Supreme Court held that the FAA preempted state statutes and 
judicial decisions that treated class-action waivers embedded in 
arbitration clauses as unconscionable.35 Although many states 
prohibit the enforcement of class-action waivers in traditional 
contracts without arbitration clauses,36 the Court in Concepcion held 
these laws inapplicable when the class-action waiver resides in an 
arbitration clause.37 The decision provided a road map to firms 
wishing to eliminate class actions: put an otherwise unenforceable 
 
 31. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 636–37. 
 32. See id. 
 33. See infra notes 39–43. 
 34. 563 U.S. 333 (2011). 
 35. Id. at 341. 
 36. Leslie, supra note 3, at 277–78. 
 37. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 339, 351 (reasoning that the FAA preempted state laws 
that considered class-action waivers embedded in arbitration clauses to be unconscionable 
and, thus, unenforceable). 
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class-action waiver into an arbitration clause and thereby put the 
waiver beyond the reach of the unconscionability doctrine.38 
In American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant,39 the 
Supreme Court effectively eliminated the Effective Vindication 
Doctrine as a means to ensure that victims of illegal business conduct 
can seek a meaningful remedy.40 The Italian Colors Court considered 
whether the Effective Vindication Doctrine precluded an antitrust 
defendant from enforcing a class-action waiver in an arbitration 
clause when the cost of pursuing an individual claim could surpass $1 
million while the maximum possible recovery was less than $40,000.41 
A closely divided Court held that “a contractual waiver of class 
arbitration is enforceable under the Federal Arbitration Act when the 
plaintiff’s cost of individually arbitrating a federal statutory claim 
exceeds the potential recovery.”42 Writing for the majority, Justice 
Scalia claimed that victims of antitrust violations still had a right to 
pursue their claims in individual arbitration, even if no rational 
plaintiff would do so because the cost exceeded the maximum 
recovery.43 By asserting that “the antitrust laws do not guarantee an 
affordable procedural path to the vindication of every claim,”44 
Justice Scalia effectively abolished the Effective Vindication Doctrine 
as a means to protect plaintiffs from unfair mandatory arbitration 
clauses.45 Businesses can now use arbitration clauses to impose class-
action waivers on their customers, which makes individual claims 
against a law-breaking firm too uneconomical to pursue. 
B. The Growth of Pro-Defendant Arbitration Clauses in Consumer 
Contracts 
The Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence encouraged 
businesses to compel their customers to waive their access to court. In 
many industries, most of the major firms include mandatory 
arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts.46 For example, the 
 
 38. Leslie, supra note 3, at 292–95. 
 39. 133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013). 
 40. See id. at 2307, 2310. 
 41. Id. at 2308. 
 42. Id. at 2307. 
 43. See id. at 2311. 
 44. Id. at 2309. 
 45. Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Arbitration and Merger 
Approval, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 11–12 (2015). 
 46. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO 
CONGRESS, PURSUANT TO DODD-FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION ACT §	1028(A) §	1.4.1, at 9–10 (2015) (finding that most firms in the banking, 
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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau found that 98.5% of licensed 
storefronts for payday loans and that “[s]even of the eight largest 
facilities-based mobile wireless providers (87.5%), covering 99.9% of 
subscribers,” imposed arbitration clauses on their customers.47 As a 
result, “[t]ens of millions of consumers use consumer financial 
products or services that are subject to pre-dispute arbitration 
clauses.”48 Because almost all of these clauses contain class-action 
waivers,49 this can make it hard—if not impossible—for consumers to 
protect their right to litigate. 
The inability of consumers to avoid arbitration clauses can 
fundamentally undermine laws designed to protect consumer 
interests.50 Mandatory arbitration clauses favor defendants in a 
number of important ways. The calculus of arbitration clauses is far 
different in consumer contracts than commercial contracts. In 
relationships between commercial parties, buyers and sellers are 
similarly likely to be the plaintiff or defendant. In consumer litigation, 
the probability of litigation positions is highly asymmetrical: the seller 
is far more likely to be the defendant in any dispute, and the 
consumer the plaintiff. As a result, if businesses can structure their 
arbitration clauses to include pro-defendant terms, businesses can 
channel customer complaints into arbitration and then undermine 
many aspects of consumer protection law. 
1.  Pro-Defendant Process 
By forcing consumer-initiated disputes into arbitration, 
businesses can reduce their likelihood of liability because the 
arbitration process favors defendants in consumer litigation in three 
important ways. First, arbitration generally provides for less discovery 
 
credit card, prepaid card provider, payday loan, private student loan, and mobile wireless 
provider industries included arbitration clauses in contracts). 
 47. Id. §	2.3, at 7; see also id. §	2.3.4 (detailing payday loan industry’s use of arbitration 
clauses); id. §	2.3.6 (detailing mobile wireless providers’ use of arbitration clauses). 
 48. Id. §	1.4.1, at 9. 
 49. Id. §	1.4.1, at 10 (“Across each product market, 85–100% of the contracts with 
arbitration clauses—covering close to 100% of market share subject to arbitration in the 
six product markets studied—include such no-class arbitration provisions.”). 
 50. See J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 
YALE L.J. 3052, 3082 (2015) (“[I]f exculpation is buried in the fine print of a maze of 
difficult-to-understand procedural provisions, then the result is private legal reform largely 
removed from public scrutiny as well as judicial scrutiny.”); see also Myriam Gilles, The 
Day Doctrine Died: Private Arbitration and the End of Law, 2016 U. ILL. L. REV. 371, 376 
(2016) (“For the entire categories of cases that are ushered into [arbitration]—from 
consumer law, to employment law, to much of antitrust law—common law doctrinal 
development will cease.”). 
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than traditional litigation. The parties in arbitration have less access 
to depositions, interrogatories, document requests, motions to 
compel, third-party documents and testimony,51 and foreign-based 
evidence.52 Limited discovery generally favors the defendants in 
consumer-initiated litigation because consumers are more likely to 
need the defendants’ documents to prove their case than the 
defendants are going to need any documents from the consumers to 
mount a defense.53 Furthermore, arbitration may empower 
defendants to simply refuse to produce damning documents. Because 
arbitrators are generally less aggressive regarding discovery and 
federal courts defer to arbitrators in discovery disputes,54 defendants 
in arbitration may be more emboldened to withhold incriminating 
documents.55 
Second, the adjudication and review procedures in arbitration 
may favor defendants. Arbitrators can grant the equivalent of 
summary judgment or a motion to dismiss against a plaintiff, and the 
plaintiff has no meaningful recourse.56 Even an arbiter’s mistakes of 
law may be insufficient to justify judicial correction of an arbiter’s 
 
 51. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 14–17; see Donald I. Baker & Mark R. Stabile, 
Arbitration of Antitrust Claims: Opportunities and Hazards for Corporate Counsel, 48 BUS. 
L. 395, 410 (1993) (noting “the difficulties in acquiring evidence from unwilling third 
parties” in antitrust arbitration); Charles E. Buffon & Joshua D. Wolson, Antitrust 
Arbitration Counseling, 19 ANTITRUST 31, 32 (2004) (“[S]ome arbitration rules do not 
permit depositions .	.	.	. Similarly, arbitration rules can be selected that do not allow 
document discovery that is as broad as that permitted under federal and state procedural 
rules .	.	.	.”); Thomas Campbell, Roxane Busey & Peter Koch, Arbitrating Antitrust 
Claims—The Road Less Traveled, 19 ANTITRUST 8, 8 (2004) (“[D]epositions, 
interrogatories, document requests, .	.	. motions to compel, .	.	. [and] third-party discovery 
.	.	. are generally disfavored [in arbitration].”); Myriam Gilles & Anthony Sebok, Crowd-
Classing Individual Arbitrations in a Post-Class Action Era, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 447, 464 
n.66 (2014) (“For example, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) Healthcare 
Payor Provider Arbitration Rules .	.	. limit discovery to one deposition per party unless 
ordered by the arbitrator.”); Elizabeth B. McCallum & R. Mark McCareins, Arbitration 
Procedures: The Rules of the Road in Arbitrating Antitrust Disputes, 19 ANTITRUST 15, 18 
(2004) (“The circuits are split on whether the arbitrators have authority under the FAA to 
order third-party production of evidence before the arbitration hearing .	.	.	.”); see also 
Integrity Ins. Co. v. Am. Centennial Ins. Co., 885 F. Supp. 69, 71–73 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), 
abrogated on other grounds by Life Receivables Tr. v. Syndicate 102 at Lloyd’s of London, 
549 F.3d 210 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 52. Baker & Stabile, supra note 51, at 411 (“The problem of third-party discovery in 
arbitration is generally more complex in the international context.”). 
 53. In re Auto. Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig., MDL No. 1426, 2004 WL 7200711, 
at *3 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 29, 2004) (noting that “in antitrust actions, .	.	. ‘the proof is largely in 
the hands of the alleged conspirators’” (quoting Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 
F.2d 90, 95 (3d Cir. 1988)). 
 54. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 55. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 16. 
 56. See McCallum & McCareins, supra note 51, at 19. 
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errors.57 Although judicial review of arbitration decisions is 
theoretically possible, it is functionally non-existent.58 Even when an 
arbiter’s mistakes are dispositive, courts treat arbitration decisions as 
“final and effectively unappealable.”59 Coupled with the fact that 
many arbiters are liable to be biased in favor of business defendants,60 
the absence of a meaningful appeals process is particularly troubling. 
Third, private arbitration is, by definition, private. The 
confidentiality of the process makes it harder to hold defendants 
accountable in the court of public opinion. More importantly, 
confidentiality provisions likely prevent plaintiffs from learning about 
the arguments and outcomes of previous arbitration proceedings 
against the defendants. Indeed, some arbitration provisions explicitly 
forbid coordination and information sharing among private 
plaintiffs.61 All of this gives the defendant, who is a repeat player62 
and can learn much from its previous arbitrations, an informational 
advantage over individual plaintiffs. 
2.  Pro-Defendant Terms 
In addition to a process that generally favors defendants, 
businesses often write their arbitration clauses to include specific 
terms that are designed to negate many pro-plaintiff aspects of 
consumer protection laws. Despite the fact that many judges would 
find such terms unenforceable in court-based litigation, arbiters may 
enforce these anti-plaintiff terms.63 This section reviews several 
 
 57. See Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Payne, 374 F.3d 672, 675 (8th Cir. 2004) 
(“[E]rrors	of	law	are	not	reviewable. Even if we would have reached a different 
conclusion, we cannot substitute our judgment for that of the arbitrators.”). 
 58. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 20–22; McCallum & McCareins, supra note 51, 
at 21 (“Thus, the arbitrator’s ‘“improvident, even silly, fact-finding” does not provide a 
basis for a reviewing court to refuse to enforce the award.’” (quoting Major League 
Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001)). 
 59. Buffon & Wolson, supra note 48, at 33; see SZALAI, OUTSOURCING JUSTICE, 
supra note 18, at 7 (“Courts have described the judicial review of arbitrator’s awards as 
‘one of the narrowest standards of judicial review in all of American jurisprudence,’ and 
even if an arbitrator was wrong in interpreting or applying the law, the arbitrator’s flawed 
award will still stand.” (footnotes omitted) (quoting Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Home 
Ins. Co., 429 F.3d 640, 643 (6th Cir. 2005))); John J. Finn, Private Arbitration and Antitrust 
Enforcement: A Conflict of Policies, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 406, 413 (1969). 
 60. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 17–20. 
 61. Leslie, supra note 3, at 290–91. 
 62. See generally Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Do the “Haves” Come Out Ahead in 
Alternative Judicial Systems?: Repeat Players in ADR, 15 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 19 
(1999) (arguing that alternative dispute resolution participants with more resources and 
experience have more favorable outcomes). 
 63. Leslie, supra note 3, at 282. 
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categories of terms in arbitration clauses that circumvent pro-plaintiff 
laws. 
Damage Limitations. Many consumer laws provide for more than 
compensatory damages. Exemplary damages, such as punitive 
damages, can deter future violations of the law.64 To emphasize the 
importance of enhanced-damages provisions, many statutes preclude 
parties from waiving them.65 Independent of statutory prohibitions, 
state courts may decline to enforce contract provisions that purport to 
prohibit money damages altogether.66 Many firms have sought to 
evade such laws and rulings by including damage-limitation 
provisions in their arbitration clauses, which often prohibit punitive 
damages, incidental damages, or any other damages greater than 
simple compensatory damages.67 While some arbitration clauses 
explicitly cap damages,68 others strip arbiters of any “authority to 
award any punitive or exemplary damages” or “extra contractual 
damages of any kind . . . .”69 Many of these contractual damage-
limitation provisions would be unenforceable in court, but they may 
be enforced in arbitration.70 At least some judges have acknowledged 
this asymmetry that allows firms to use arbitration to limit damages in 
ways that courts would not countenance.71  
 
 64. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974). 
 65. See, e.g., Capital Equip., Inc. v. CNH Am., LLC, 471 F. Supp. 2d 951, 957 (E.D. 
Ark. 2006); Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc., 60 Cal. Rptr. 2d 138, 154 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997); Gessa 
v. Manor Care of Fla., Inc., 86 So. 3d 484, 493 (Fla. 2011). 
 66. See, e.g., Health Net of Cal., Inc. v. Dep’t of Health Servs., 6 Cal. Rptr. 3d 235, 
237–38 (Cal. Ct. App. 2003) (invalidating an insurance contract clause that prohibited the 
recovery of damages). 
 67. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 46, §	2.5.6, at 47 (“Damages 
limitations in prepaid card contracts with arbitration clauses were more frequent, and 
almost always precluded recovery of both punitive and consequential damages.”); Leslie, 
supra note 3, at 284–86 (collecting cases); Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and 
Unconscionability After Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
1001, 1025 (1996). 
 68. See, e.g., Crewe v. Rich Dad Educ., LLC, 884 F. Supp. 2d 60, 67–68 (S.D.N.Y. 
2012). 
 69. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 405 (2003); accord Captain 
Bounce, Inc. v. Bus. Fin. Servs., Inc., No. 11–CV–858 JLS (WMC), 2012 WL 928412, at *2 
(S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2012) (“The arbitrator at such arbitration shall not be entitled to award 
punitive damages to any party, and the costs and fees of such arbitration shall be borne by 
the losing party.”). 
 70. Leslie, supra note 3, at 284–86; see, e.g., Larry’s United Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253 
F.3d 1083, 1085–86 (8th Cir. 2001) (allowing arbiter to determine enforceability of a 
damage-limitation provision). 
 71. See Stark v. Sandberg, Phoenix & von Gontard, P.C., 381 F.3d 793, 800 (8th Cir. 
2004). 
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Anti-Injunction Terms. Injunctive relief plays an important role 
in many areas of consumer law. Judges have the inherent power to 
enjoin future violations of the law and also to require defendants to 
remedy the effects of their prior violations. Although courts will not 
enforce contractual provisions that preemptively waive a customer or 
employee’s right to injunctive relief,72 some businesses include anti-
injunction language in their arbitration clauses.73 Arbiters may be 
more likely to enforce contractual provisions that prohibit injunctive 
relief.74 Even in the absence of anti-injunction language, funneling 
disputes into arbitration reduces the likelihood of law-breaking firms 
facing injunctive measures because arbiters lack the authority to issue 
injunctions75 or the competence to devise and enforce effective 
injunctive relief. 
Fee-Shifting Provisions. Some consumer laws contain pro-
plaintiff one-way fee-shifting provisions, which means that a 
successful plaintiff can recover attorneys’ fees but a successful 
defendant cannot.76 Such provisions encourage plaintiffs to bring 
colorable claims, especially those with low compensatory damages 
that would otherwise render a lawsuit too uneconomical to bring.77 
Firms likely to be defendants in litigation have attempted to blunt 
pro-plaintiff fee-shifting provisions by trying to contract around them, 
but many courts have rejected such contractual evasions of the law.78 
 
 72. Leslie, supra note 3, at 286. 
 73. Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Fla. E. Coast Ry., LLC, No. 3:13–cv–576–J–34JRK, 2014 WL 
757942, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 26, 2014) (noting arbitration provision stating that “the 
arbitrator .	.	. will not issue injunctive relief”). 
 74. See Myriam Gilles, Individualized Injunctions and No-Modification Terms: 
Challenging “Anti-Reform” Provisions in Arbitration Clauses, 69 U. MIAMI L. REV. 469, 
472 (2015) (“‘[A]nti-reform’ provisions .	.	. prohibit an individual arbitral claimant from 
seeking to end a practice, change a rule, or enjoin an act that causes injury to itself and to 
similarly-situated non-parties.”). 
 75. Gilles & Sebok, supra note 51, at 465 (“[B]ecause arbitrators lack the authority to 
enjoin ongoing wrongful activity, each claimant bringing a separate claim has no overall 
impact on policy or practices that have widespread effect.”). 
 76. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §	1640 (2012); Kirby v. Immoos Fire Prot., Inc., 140 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 173, 180 (Cal. Ct. App. 2012) (referring to “one-way fee-shifting provision” in 
California Labor Code section	1194). 
 77. Leslie, supra note 3, at 287; see Sutherland v. Ernst & Young LLP, 768 F. Supp. 2d 
547, 548–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), rev’d on other grounds, 726 F.3d 290 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 78. See, e.g., Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 601 F. App’x 461, 463 (9th Cir. 
2014); In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., 485 F. App’x 403, 406 (11th Cir. 2012) 
(finding fee-shifting provision unconscionable because it required a “customer to pay the 
bank’s costs in any dispute between the customer and the bank regardless of who 
prevails”); Delta Funding Corp. v. Harris, 912 A.2d 104, 112 (N.J. 2006); see also Byram 
Concretanks, Inc. v. Warren Concrete Prod. Co. of N.J., 374 F.2d 649, 651 (3d Cir. 1967) 
(“We hold that in the absence of specific legislative authorization attorneys’ fees may not 
be awarded to defendants in private anti-trust litigation.”); LaCoursiere v. Camwest Dev., 
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Undeterred, firms have tried to circumvent pro-plaintiff fee-shifting 
laws by drafting their arbitration clauses to preclude all fee shifting,79 
to mandate two-way “loser pays” fee shifting,80 or even to impose pro-
defendant, one-way fee shifting such that only the successful 
defendant can recover costs.81 Such provisions can deter plaintiffs 
from bringing meritorious litigation.82 While courts are prone to reject 
such attempts as unconscionable,83 some courts defer to arbiters on 
these matters.84 
Truncated Statutes of Limitations. Firms may also use arbitration 
clauses to shorten statutes of limitations. Many consumer protection 
laws have relatively generous statutes of limitations,85 and several 
states prohibit contracting parties from shortening the statutes of 
limitations.86 In contrast, other states grant parties some ability to 
 
Inc., 339 P.3d 963, 970 (Wash. 2014) (en banc) (citing cases finding pro-defendant one-way 
fee shifting unconscionable). 
 79. See, e.g., Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) 
(Kagan, J., dissenting) (“The agreement precludes any shifting of costs to Amex, even if 
Italian Colors prevails.”); Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. SACV 03-130 DOC, 2003 
WL 21530185, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2003) (“[E]ach party will pay the fees and costs of 
its own counsel, experts and witnesses .	.	.	.”). 
 80. See, e.g., Captain Bounce, Inc. v. Bus. Fin. Servs., No. 11-CV-858-JLS (WMC), 
2012 WL 928412, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2012) (“[T]he costs and fees of such arbitration 
shall be borne by the losing party.”); see also In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust 
Litig., 700 F.3d 109, 113 (3d Cir. 2012); Myriam Gilles, Killing Them with Kindness: 
Examining “Consumer-Friendly” Arbitration Clauses After AT&T Mobility v. 
Concepcion, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 825, 859 (2012) (discussing examples of “loser 
pays” fee shifting). 
 81. See, e.g., Samaniego v. Empire Today LLC, 140 Cal. Rptr. 3d 492, 499–500 (Cal. 
Ct. App. 2012) (finding arbitration clauses unconscionable, in part, because they 
“require[d] plaintiffs to pay any attorneys’ fees incurred by [the defendant] but impose[d] 
no reciprocal obligation on [the defendant]”). 
 82. See Myriam Gilles & Gary Friedman, After Class: Aggregate Litigation in the 
Wake of AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 623, 635 (2012) (noting that 
fee-shifting provisions can chill plaintiffs from bringing suit because the suit’s “financial 
burdens [would be] so prohibitive as to deter the bringing of claims”); see also Delta 
Funding Corp., 912 A.2d at 112 (“The prospect of having to shoulder all the costs of 
arbitration could chill .	.	. consumers from pursuing their statutory claims through 
mandatory arbitration.”). 
 83. See supra note 78. 
 84. See Venture Cotton Coop. v. Freeman, 435 S.W.3d 222, 232 (Tex. 2014) (holding 
that the issue of unconscionability of fee-shifting provision is for the arbiter to decide). 
 85. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §	1679i (2012) (providing that the Credit Repair Organizations 
Act has a five-year statute of limitations). 
 86. See ALA. CODE §	6-2-15 (West, Westlaw through 2017 Reg. Sess.) (“[A]ny 
agreement or stipulation, verbal or written, whereby the time for the commencement of 
any action is limited to a time less than that prescribed by law for the commencement of 
such action is void.”); FLA. STAT. ANN. §	95.03 (West 2017) (“Any provision in a contract 
fixing the period of time within which an action arising out of the contract may be begun 
at a time less than that provided by the applicable statute of limitations is void.”); In re 
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contractually truncate the applicable statute of limitations,87 but only 
if the contractually imposed limitations period is not “unreasonably 
short.”88 Courts may refuse to enforce contractually-truncated 
limitations periods that are too short, treating the contract provision 
as substantively unconscionable.89 Some firms try to use arbitration to 
avoid litigating in courts before judges who would invalidate a 
contract provision that significantly truncates the applicable statute of 
limitations.90 Arbiters may have more latitude and willingness to 
enforce contractually shortened statutes of limitations.91 When 
defendants are able to truncate statutes of limitation, lawbreakers 
may prevent their victims from pursuing meritorious claims. 
Class-Action Waivers. Arbitration clauses increasingly contain 
class-action waivers. In its recent report on arbitration clauses in the 
financial sector, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau found 
that “[n]early all the arbitration clauses studied include provisions 
 
Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 287 n.8 (4th Cir. 2007) (“South Carolina law 
prohibits contractual shortening of statutes of limitation.”); Honeywell, Inc. v. Ruby 
Tuesday, Inc., 43 F. Supp. 2d 1074, 1078 (D. Minn. 1999) (describing shortening of statutes 
of limitations as “illegal per se”). 
 87. See, e.g., Sanders v. Comcast Cable Holdings, LLC, No. 3:07-cv-918-J-33HTS, 
2008 WL 150479, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 14, 2008); Blue Shield of Cal. Life & Health Ins. 
Co. v. Superior Court, 120 Cal. Rptr. 3d 713, 720 (Cal. Ct. App. 2011); Wilson Fertilizer & 
Grain, Inc. v. ADM Milling Co., 654 N.E.2d 848, 853 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Nez v. Forney, 
1989-NMSC-074, ¶ 7–8, 109 N.M. 161, 783 P.2d 471. 
 88. Bd. of Supervisors v. Sampson, 369 S.E.2d 178, 180 (Va. 1988) (permitting parties 
to alter a statute of limitations “if the contractual provision is not against public policy and 
if the agreed time is not unreasonably short”); see Alexander v. Anthony Int’l, L.P., 341 
F.3d 256, 266 (3d Cir. 2003) (“We recognize that a provision limiting the time to bring a 
claim or provide notice of such a claim to the defendant is not necessarily unfair or 
otherwise unconscionable. But such a time period must still be reasonable.”); Hambrecht 
& Quist Venture Partners v. Am. Med. Int’l, Inc., 46 Cal. Rptr. 2d 33, 43 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995) (“As for shortening the limitations period, the courts will enforce the parties’ 
agreement provided it is reasonable.”). 
 89. Zaborowski v. MHN Gov’t Servs., Inc., 601 F. App’x 461, 463 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(“[T]he contract’s sixth-month limitations period is substantively unconscionable.”); see 
also Shahin v. I.E.S. Inc., 988 N.E.2d 873, 875 (Mass. App. Ct. 2013) (“The limitations 
period set out in the contract is one year from the date of the contract .	.	.	. The limitations 
period thus expired one year from the date of the contract—regardless of the date of any 
alleged breach or its discovery .	.	.	. [I]t is therefore invalid and unenforceable.”). 
 90. Leslie, supra note 3, at 284. 
 91. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 13–22 (describing arbiters’ wide discretion 
and potential bias when applying law); Edward J. Underhill, Statutes of Limitation and 
Arbitration: Limiting Your Client’s Exposure, 101 ILL. B.J. 244, 244 (2013) (“Contrary to 
what many lawyers think, it’s not safe to assume general statutes of limitation 
automatically apply to Illinois arbitration claims. That’s why you should consider including 
a clause limiting your client’s exposure in your arbitration agreements.”).  
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stating that arbitration may not proceed on a class basis.”92 These 
waivers often deny individual victims of illegal conduct any remedy 
because “consumers almost never initiate individual claims against 
companies in arbitration.”93 Thus, arbitration clauses with class-action 
waivers can effectively eliminate the defendant’s liability outright.94 
While state courts may refuse to enforce class-action waivers in 
litigation because of the Supreme Court’s Concepcion opinion, state 
judges are powerless to stop the enforcement of arbitration clauses 
that require the arbiter to enforce the class-action waiver.95 Similarly, 
federal judges must defer to class-action waivers if embedded in an 
arbitration clause. 
In sum, arbitration clauses today bear little resemblance to the 
arbitration clauses of the 1920s, when Congress enacted the FAA. 
Businesses appear less interested in using arbitration to settle their 
inter-merchant disputes96 and more interested in using arbitration 
clauses to deny their customers meaningful access to the court 
system.97 
II.  CONSPIRACIES TO ARBITRATE 
What explains the growth of arbitration clauses? The 
proliferation of arbitration clauses could be the result of firms 
independently realizing the pro-business benefits of mandatory 
arbitration and, consequently, unilaterally inserting arbitration 
clauses into their consumer contracts. No business wants to be a 
 
 92. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 46, §	1.4.1, at 10 (“Across each 
product market, 85–100% of the contracts with arbitration clauses—covering close to 
100% of market share subject to arbitration in the six product markets studied—include 
such no-class arbitration provisions.”). 
 93. Jean R. Sternlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration Clauses Prevent Consumers 
from Presenting Procedurally Difficult Claims, 42 SW. L. REV. 87, 98 (2012). 
 94. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 37. 
 95. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 340, 357 (2011). 
 96. Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily Sherwin, Arbitration’s Summer 
Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer 
Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 876 (2008) (finding that, for firms that impose 
arbitration clauses on their customers and employees, “less than 10% of their negotiated 
non-consumer, non-employment contracts included arbitration clauses”); see also 
MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND 
THE RULE OF LAW 280 n.26 (2013) (interpreting the Eisenberg, Miller & Sherwin study as 
“provid[ing] evidence that avoiding class actions is the principal purpose of many 
arbitration clauses”). 
 97. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, 
Stacking the Deck of Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2015, at 22 (“Corporations said that class 
actions were not needed because arbitration enabled individuals to resolve their 
grievances easily. But court and arbitration records show the opposite has happened: Once 
blocked from going to court as a group, most people dropped their claims entirely.”). 
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defendant in state or federal court. Mandatory arbitration provides a 
way for firms to avoid court altogether, even if they have broken the 
law. Thus, it may be tempting for businesses to simply require all 
customers to submit to arbitration. However, given the anti-consumer 
nature of arbitration clauses, a firm that unilaterally imposes 
mandatory arbitration may lose customers to other competitors who 
do not require mandatory arbitration. Firms want to attain the pro-
business advantages of mandatory arbitration without losing business 
to rivals. The solution may be to agree with one’s competitors that all 
of the firms in the relevant market will insert arbitration clauses in 
their consumer contracts. This Part discusses the legality and 
dynamics of such conspiracies to arbitrate. 
A. The Illegality of Early Efforts to Impose Arbitration Through 
Collusion 
The Supreme Court first analyzed conspiracies to arbitrate in 
1930 in Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States.98 Ten movie 
distributors, responsible for distributing sixty percent of the films 
exhibited by 25,000 theater owners (referred to as “exhibitors”), 
agreed to impose a standard contract on all exhibitors.99 Section 18 of 
this standard contract provided that “each party shall submit any 
controversy that may arise to a board of arbitration . . . .”100 
Consequently, the distributors agreed with each other to require 
mandatory arbitration for all disputes, forcing exhibitors to 
preemptively waive their right to a jury trial for any contractual 
disputes.101 As an enforcement mechanism, the distributor-drafted 
standardized contract provided that if any exhibitor refused to 
arbitrate or to comply with an arbitration award to any one 
distributor, then all of the distributors were required to demand 
security deposits from that exhibitor.102 Through this provision, the 
distributors could collectively enforce the arbitration clauses of 
individual distributors. The Department of Justice challenged section 
18 as a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.103 In no uncertain 
 
 98. 282 U.S. 30 (1930). 
 99. Id. at 36–37 (“Under an agreement amongst themselves Appellant Distributors 
will only contract with Exhibitors according to the terms of the Standard Exhibition 
Contract .	.	.	.”). 
 100. Id. at 37–38. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at 40. 
 103. Id. at 36; see 15 U.S.C. §	1 (2012) (condemning agreements that unreasonably 
restrain trade). 
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terms, the Supreme Court held the distributors’ agreement to impose 
mandatory arbitration on the exhibitors violated antitrust law.104 
In condemning section 18 of the standardized contracts, the 
Supreme Court in Paramount Famous Lasky appeared to hold that 
conspiracies to arbitrate are per se illegal. The per se rule in antitrust 
law is categorical. When an agreement falls in a per se category, it is 
condemned without proof that the particular agreement unreasonably 
restrains trade.105 The per se rule applies to categories of restraint 
“that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition”106 
and that “lack . . . any redeeming virtue . . . .”107 Traditional 
categories of “per se illegality include horizontal price fixing among 
competitors, group boycotts, and horizontal market division 
. . . .”108 If their agreement falls in a per se category, antitrust 
defendants are precluded from arguing that their agreement is 
justified by a legitimate business reason, such as the industry-specific 
context.109 
Several aspects of the Paramount Famous Lasky opinion point to 
the Court using a per se approach. For example, the Court agreed 
with the government’s characterization that the agreement among 
distributors had “the necessary and inevitable tendency . . . to 
produce material and unreasonable restraint of interstate commerce 
in violation of the Sherman Act.”110 This is the lexicon of per se 
illegality in antitrust law. Furthermore, the Court concluded that the 
distributors’ agreement “necessarily and directly tends to destroy ‘the 
kind of competition to which the public has long looked for 
protection.’”111 This, again, is similar to the language that modern 
courts use when condemning an agreement as per se illegal.112 
 
 104. See Paramount Famous Lasky, 282 U.S. at 43. 
 105. Jefferson Par. Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 33 (1984) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring in the judgment) (“Under the usual logic of the per se rule, a restraint on trade 
that rarely serves any purposes other than to restrain competition is illegal without proof 
of market power or anticompetitive effect.”), abrogated on other grounds by Ill. Tool 
Works Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006). 
 106. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 
289–90 (1985) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19–20 
(1979)). 
 107. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958). 
 108. Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Int’l, Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1334 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 109. See Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 486 (1st Cir. 1988). 
 110. Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30, 41 (1930). 
 111. Id. at 43 (emphasis added) (quoting United States v. Am. Oil Co., 262 U.S. 371, 
390 (1923)). 
 112. See Cont’l T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 49–50 (1977) (“Per se rules 
of illegality are appropriate only when they relate to conduct that is manifestly 
anticompetitive.”). In contrast, vertical restraints do not fall within the per se rule because 
96 N.C. L. REV. 381 (2018) 
2017] CONSPIRACY TO ARBITRATE 403 
The Paramount Famous Lasky opinion’s per se approach to 
conspiracies to arbitrate is also reflected in the Court’s refusal to 
credit any of the defendants’ industry-specific justifications for why 
the conspiracy to arbitrate at issue did not unreasonably restrain 
trade. Specifically, the Court held that the fact that the standard 
contract and its arbitration provision were the product of “six years of 
discussion and experimentation” could not render valid a 
combination that “unduly restrain[s] competition.”113 The Court both 
conceded and rejected the possibility that the conspiracy to arbitrate 
improved the efficiency of the motion picture industry.114 The 
rejection of industry-specific justifications is a hallmark of antitrust 
law’s per se rule.115 Similarly, the Court stated that the defendants’ 
“good motives” were not relevant and provided no defense.116 This 
decision again mirrors the per se rule, as courts only consider the 
defendants’ intent when applying the rule of reason, but not when the 
agreement falls in a per se category.117 In sum, Paramount Famous 
Lasky treated conspiracies to arbitrate as per se illegal.118 
 
“vertical agreements do not necessarily threaten an injury to competition.” Brantley v. 
NBC Universal, Inc., 675 F.3d 1192, 1198 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 113. Paramount Famous Lasky, 282 U.S. at 43 (quoting E. States Retail Lumber 
Dealers’ Ass’n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600, 613 (1914)). 
 114. Id. (“It may be that arbitration is well adapted to the needs of the motion picture 
industry; but when under the guise of arbitration parties enter into unusual arrangements 
which unreasonably suppress normal competition their action becomes illegal.”). 
 115. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (stating that agreements 
falling in a per se category are “conclusively presumed to be unreasonable and therefore 
illegal without elaborate inquiry as to the precise harm they have caused or the business 
excuse for their use”); In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 332 F.3d 896, 909 (6th Cir. 
2003) (“To reiterate, the virtue/vice of the per se rule is that it allows courts to presume 
that certain behaviors as a class are anticompetitive without expending judicial resources 
to evaluate the actual anticompetitive effects or procompetitive justifications in a 
particular case.”). 
 116. Paramount Famous Lasky, 282 U.S. at 44 (quoting Standard Sanitary Mfg. Co. v. 
United States, 226 U.S. 20, 49 (1912)). 
 117. XI HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶	1911, at 266 (1998) (“[U]nder the 
per se rule power, intent, effect, and most defenses are irrelevant; under the rule of reason 
all are essential.”); see, e.g., Feminist Women’s Health Ctr., Inc. v. Mohammad, 415 F. 
Supp. 1258, 1262 (N.D. Fla. 1976) (“[E]vidence of the good intentions of defendants has 
historically been deemed irrelevant in per se cases.”). 
 118. Some courts and commentators have recognized that the Paramount Famous 
Lasky Court took a per se approach. See U.S. Trotting Ass’n v. Chicago Downs Ass’n, 665 
F.2d 781, 789 (7th Cir. 1981) (characterizing Paramount Famous Lasky as a per se case, 
“involv[ing] conduct that can only be anticompetitive,” namely “cartelization to require 
acceptance of a standard form contract”); id. at 794 (Bauer, J., dissenting) (“The courts 
clearly have the requisite experience with group boycotts to hold that they are per se 
unlawful.”) (citing, among other cases, Paramount Famous Lasky); see Joseph P. Bauer, 
Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 COLUM. 
L. REV. 685, 688 (1979) (“The Court in Paramount did not discuss whether the per se rule 
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Even without the precedent of Paramount Famous Lasky, a 
conspiracy to arbitrate satisfies the criteria for per se condemnation. 
Such conspiracies “always or almost always tend to restrict 
competition”119 because with a conspiracy to arbitrate in place, rivals 
do not compete with respect to this important contract term. 
 
should be extended to include concerted refusals to deal; its decision, however, is difficult 
to justify solely under the rule of reason. There was virtually no discussion of the nature of 
the injury, either to the parties or to the public, of how competition would be affected, or 
even of why the practice was ‘unreasonable.’ In short, the Court was unwilling to consider 
the potential benefits of these agreements.”); see also Edward Brunet & David J. 
Sweeney, Integrating Antitrust Procedure and Substance After Northwest Wholesale 
Stationers: Evolving Antitrust Approaches to Pleadings, Burden of Proof, and Boycotts, 72 
VA. L. REV. 1015, 1024 (1986) (“Although the Paramount Famous Lasky decision did not 
contain language terming group refusals to deal per se illegal, the Court refused to give 
detailed consideration to the reasonableness of the restraints and failed to discuss why the 
contract at issue was illegal or how any economic injury occurred.”). 
  Some lower courts, however, have not treated Paramount Famous Lasky as a per 
se case. See, e.g., De Jong Packing Co. v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 618 F.2d 1329, 
1335 n.8 (9th Cir. 1980) (“The Supreme Court did not indicate in Paramount Famous 
Lasky Corp. or First National Pictures, Inc., whether it was proceeding under the rule of 
reason or whether it deemed the practices in question illegal per se.”). This 
misinterpretation stems from courts improperly obsessing on the phrase “per se illegality,” 
which the Court did not use. Although Paramount Famous Lasky did not use the phrase 
“per se illegal,” that is neither surprising nor dispositive. The case was decided in 1930, 
and the Supreme Court did not explicitly refer to price-fixing agreements as per se illegal 
until 1940. See United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 218 (1940). United 
States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927), hinted at per se illegality by denying 
defendants the ability to argue that price fixing is legal if the fixed price is reasonable, but 
the Court did not employ the “per se” terminology. Id. at 397–98. While not using the 
phrase “per se” itself, see id., the Court nonetheless used language that has become the 
hallmark of per se illegality. 
  Other per se cases of the era did not explicitly say “per se” either. For example, 
the Paramount Famous Lasky Court cited Eastern States Lumber Ass’n v. United States, 
234 U.S. 600 (1914), a decision that treated a concerted refusal to deal as per se illegal. Id. 
at 614. Like Paramount Famous Lasky, the Eastern States opinion did not use the phrase 
“per se illegality,” but Eastern States is nonetheless considered to be a per se case. See, e.g., 
U.S. Healthcare, Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 593 (1st Cir. 1993) (citing Eastern 
States as an example of behavior warranting “per se condemnation”); Vogel v. Am. Soc. of 
Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 600 (7th Cir. 1984) (describing Eastern States as “the Supreme 
Court’s first case holding that a boycott was illegal per se”); M&H Tire Co. v. Hoosier 
Racing Tire Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 977 (1st Cir. 1984) (describing Eastern States as holding 
that “horizontal collaboration among lumber retailers [is] considered per se illegal”); E.A. 
McQuade Tours, Inc. v. Consol. Air Tour Manual Comm., 467 F.2d 178, 186 (5th Cir. 
1972) (citing Eastern States as a “case[] applying per se illegality to collective refusals to 
deal”). 
 119. Nw. Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pac. Stationery & Printing Co., 472 U.S. 284, 
289–90 (1985) (quoting Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S 1, 19–20 
(1979)). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 381 (2018) 
2017] CONSPIRACY TO ARBITRATE 405 
Certainly, a conspiracy to arbitrate lacks “any redeeming virtue.”120 
Even if an individual arbitration clause is defensible,121 there is still no 
justification for conspiring to impose such clauses throughout a 
market.122 
Therefore, because the Paramount Famous Lasky Court applied 
a per se approach, conspiracies to arbitrate are categorically illegal. A 
conspiracy to arbitrate is considered unreasonably anticompetitive, as 
a matter of law. Once the plaintiff proves the agreement, antitrust 
liability is established.123 
After the Paramount Famous Lasky Court condemned 
conspiracies to arbitrate as violating the Sherman Act, the topic 
essentially went dormant for several decades. This is not surprising 
given the limited reach of arbitration clauses in mid-century America. 
Mandatory arbitration clauses were not generally found in consumer 
contracts, and statutory claims were excluded from arbitration.124 It 
would make little sense to commit a per se violation of the Sherman 
Act by conspiring to collectively impose contract terms that were 
likely unenforceable. 
 
 120. Cf. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958) (noting per se rule 
applies to agreements that “because of their pernicious effect on competition and lack of 
any redeeming virtue are conclusively presumed to be unreasonable” (emphasis added)). 
 121. Arguably, they are not defensible when they are laden with anti-consumer 
provisions imposed on customers through contracts of adhesion. 
 122. If such clauses are as useful or valuable as their proponents claim, firms could 
introduce them—and consumers would accept them—without the need for a conspiracy. 
 123. Even if conspiracies to arbitrate do not qualify for per se illegality or quick-look 
condemnation, courts should still find them unreasonable under the rule of reason. Rivals 
in a market are expected to compete on both contract terms and the more traditional 
areas of antitrust concern—price, quality, and service. Whenever sellers agree to impose 
similar terms on their customers, regardless of whether those terms affect price or other 
aspects of the contractual relationship, the sellers injure competition and potentially 
violate antitrust law. In condemning the conspiracy to arbitrate among movie distributors, 
the Supreme Court in Paramount Famous Lasky stated, “to establish violation of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, it is not necessary to show that the challenged arrangement 
suppresses all competition between the parties or that the parties themselves are 
discontented with the arrangement.” 282 U.S. 30, 44 (1930). Thus, the members of an 
arbitration conspiracy may continue to compete in terms of price, quality, and service, but 
that does not save a horizontal agreement to impose arbitration clauses. Agreements 
among rivals to impose arbitration clauses on their customers necessarily restrain 
competition, and they are not excused by a legitimate business justification.	While 
defendants may proffer the alleged benefits of arbitration—speed, efficiency, and 
informality—as their legitimate business justification, courts should reject any such 
defense; it is the agreement among rivals—not the arbitration clause itself—that requires a 
justification. Competitors have no legitimate reason to conspire to impose these anti-
consumer terms in their contracts. Thus, the traditional rule of reason is a longer road, but 
it leads to the same destination: illegality of conspiracies to arbitrate. 
 124. See supra Section I.A. 
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The Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence of late, however, 
has fundamentally changed the reach and value of arbitration clauses 
to businesses intent on breaking the law. Businesses can now force all 
manner of disputes—contractual, statutory, and constitutional—into 
arbitration, denying consumers access to courts. Exacerbating the 
problem, these businesses can then make arbitration infeasible 
through class-action waivers. The Supreme Court’s re-imagination of 
the purpose and reach of the FAA has made conspiracies to arbitrate 
potentially irresistible.125 Because businesses can now use arbitration 
clauses to block consumer access to courts, the following Sections 
discuss how conspiracies to arbitrate have become rational in a way 
that they were not in the first half century after Paramount Famous 
Lasky was decided. 
B. Conspiracy to Arbitrate as a Primary Conspiracy 
A conspiracy to arbitrate can be either a primary conspiracy or a 
secondary conspiracy. In a primary conspiracy to arbitrate, the 
manufacturers have no underlying or pre-existing illegal conspiracy. 
They have not agreed to fix prices or allocate customers. They have 
conspired only to impose arbitration clauses. As presented by the 
Court, the agreement condemned in Paramount Famous Lasky 
represented a primary conspiracy to arbitrate.126 
A primary conspiracy to arbitrate can involve two distinct sets of 
agreements. First, rivals could agree only that every firm in a market 
will impose mandatory arbitration clauses on their customers. Second, 
firms could conspire with respect to the terms in their arbitration 
clauses. For example, the distributors in Paramount Famous Lasky 
colluded to impose a multilateral enforcement mechanism for their 
identically worded arbitration provisions.127 More importantly, today, 
in the wake of Concepcion and Italian Colors, rival firms might agree 
that all of their arbitration clauses will include class-action waivers. 
This collusion would make individual arbitration so uneconomical 
that victims of clear legal offenses may find it pointless to bring suit. If 
the class-action waivers are not sufficient to prevent individual 
plaintiffs from pursuing arbitration, rivals could also agree to include 
specific terms in their arbitration clauses that preclude injunctive 
 
 125. See supra notes 25–45 and accompanying text. 
 126. See 282 U.S. at 37–41. 
 127. Id. at 40–41. 
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relief, prevent pro-plaintiff fee shifting, limit damages, and shorten 
the statute of limitations.128 
1.  The Motive to Conspire to Arbitrate 
The firms in a market are collectively better off if every firm 
imposes an arbitration clause on its customers. From an economic 
perspective, most firms would prefer to force their customers into 
mandatory arbitration—especially if doing so would allow the firms to 
eliminate class actions, cap damages, limit discovery, and truncate the 
statutes of limitation. Even if firms in the same market compete on 
price and product quality, they may share a communal incentive to 
impose arbitration agreements on all of their customers. 
A firm may want the protection of an arbitration clause but 
worry that imposing such a clause unilaterally will cause consumers to 
shift to another supplier that does not impose mandatory 
arbitration.129 For example, deposition testimony from an attorney at 
Citigroup in one conspiracy-to-arbitrate case “reveal[ed] that [the] 
Defendants may have been concerned that consumers would cancel 
their cards if Citigroup unilaterally adopted an arbitration clause.”130 
All firms benefit if they act in unison regarding arbitration clauses. 
That way, each firm imposing an anti-consumer arbitration clause is 
less likely to lose sales to a rival.131 If all the firms agree, then 
consumers cannot escape mandatory arbitration.132 
 
 128. See, e.g., Second Consolidated and Am. Class Action Compl. at 3, In re Universal 
Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., MDL No. 1468, 2003 WL 24047518 (D. Kan. Feb. 
20, 2009) (alleging, in an antitrust case, that defendants conspired to impose arbitration 
clauses that limited discovery, banned class actions, waived punitive damages, shortened 
statute of limitations, and required “in some instances, [plaintiffs to] pay defendants’ 
attorneys’ fees if a motion to compel arbitration is granted”). Conspirators may agree to 
use similar language that is incomprehensible to most consumers. The language of 
arbitration clauses is generally more complex than other language in the same contract, 
which makes it harder for consumers to appreciate the legal significance of an arbitration 
clause. CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 46, §	2.4, at 28. If conspirators 
conspire to use opaque language in their arbitration clauses, they may be able to make 
such clauses less salient. See infra notes 133–44. 
 129. See Mark R. Patterson, Standardization of Standard-Form Contracts: Competition 
and Contract Implications, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 327, 410–11 (2010) (“The imposition 
of unfair or burdensome terms by multiple sellers suggests that any of those sellers could 
attract buyers by not imposing those terms .	.	.	.”). 
 130. In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., Nos. M 21–95, 05 Civ. 
7116(WHP), 2012 WL 401113, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2012). 
 131. Additionally, the terms in standardized contracts, such as the inclusion and 
substance of arbitration clauses, can be “sticky”—a term that scholars use to describe the 
inertia that can delay firms from changing their contract terms. See Peter B. Rutledge & 
Christopher R. Drahozal, “Sticky” Arbitration Clauses? The Use of Arbitration Clauses 
After Concepcion and Amex, 67 VAND. L. REV. 955, 959 (2014). Contract “stickiness” can 
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One could argue that arbitration conspiracies are unnecessary 
because arbitration clauses are not salient to consumers.133 According 
to this line of thinking, consumers do not read their contracts and are 
generally unaware of the presence and content of any arbitration 
clauses within a contract. If that is true, then a firm might impose an 
arbitration clause unilaterally—even though its rivals do not require 
arbitration—and not lose sales because consumers are oblivious or 
indifferent to arbitration clauses. In such markets, a conspiracy to 
arbitrate may seem unnecessary. 
This salience argument is not as persuasive as it might seem. 
First, some evidence suggests that arbitration clauses are becoming 
more salient to consumers.134 Mainstream media sources are more 
extensively reporting about the downsides of arbitration clauses for 
consumers.135 In addition, consumers’ rights groups are educating the 
public about the consequences and drawbacks of mandatory 
arbitration.136 These efforts are emboldening consumers to resist 
publicized attempts to impose mandatory binding arbitration. For 
example, when General Mills attempted to unilaterally impose 
 
slow the adoption of arbitration clauses, see id. at 961–62, or modification of existing 
arbitration clauses to include class-action waivers. See Brian T. Fitzpatrick, The End of 
Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 192–93 (2015). A conspiracy to impose arbitration 
clauses can help overcome this stickiness by making arbitration clauses with class-action 
waivers the industry norm. 
 132. An individual firm could possibly conclude that it would be profitable to 
unilaterally impose arbitration clauses on its customers because the savings in reduced 
litigation and liability costs will exceed the value of sales lost to customers who decide to 
purchase from another seller. This is ultimately an empirical question. Joining a conspiracy 
to arbitrate, however, simplifies the calculation by allowing a firm to obtain the pro-seller 
benefits of mandatory arbitration without losing sales to competitors that do not require 
customers to accept arbitration clauses. 
 133. Salience refers to consumers’ awareness and concern about product or contract 
attributes. Price is generally salient in that consumers care about it and are more likely to 
purchase a lower-priced item than a similar, but higher-priced, item. On salience of terms 
in consumer contracts, see OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 91–92 (2012); see also id. at 94 
(“Industry sources also confirm the behavioral-economics prediction that issuers will 
aggressively compete on salient price dimensions and recoup losses through non-salient 
price dimensions.”). 
 134. Id. at 93–94; see Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(“Plaintiffs point to some signs of incipient salience with respect to class-action-barring 
arbitration, such as publicity following the Minnesota Attorney General’s action against 
the NAF and negative publicity accompanying Wells Fargo’s introduction of class-action-
barring arbitration clauses for bank account holders.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 97, at 1 (reporting on banking, 
credit card, and other industries’ usage of arbitration). 
 136. See, e.g., Arbitration, NAT’L ASS’N OF CONSUMER ADVOCATES, 
http://www.naca.net/issues/forced-arbitration [https://perma.cc/C7RR-M3DC] (providing a 
guide detailing arbitration and its negative aspects). 
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arbitration clauses on their customers, consumers protested loudly, 
and the company rescinded its policy.137 The imposition of mandatory 
arbitration clauses is particularly likely to become salient when the 
other salient features of the transactions, such as price and quality, 
are identical across sellers.138 
Second, absent a conspiracy to arbitrate, the free market process 
could increase the salience of arbitration clauses.139 Firms should 
compete on their contract terms,140 such as whether to impose 
mandatory arbitration clauses and, if so, the terms of the arbitration. 
In many markets, the terms of arbitration clauses vary, with some 
being more consumer friendly than others.141 Competitive firms would 
advertise their pro-consumer terms.142 Arbitration clauses would be 
more salient if firms (that did not require arbitration) advertised the 
 
 137. Stephanie Strom, General Mills Amends New Legal Policies, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/18/business/general-mills-amends-new-legal-
policies.html?mcubz=0 [http://perma.cc/F6NH-66L3]. Of course, it remains possible that in 
other contexts, consumers may be aware of arbitration clauses but discount their 
significance because consumers misjudge the likelihood of being in a dispute. Russell 
Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1234 (2003) (“A form term calling for arbitration of disputes in an 
inconvenient state, for example, is likely to be non-salient to the vast majority of buyers 
unless the type of contract in question commonly results in disputes.”). 
 138. Thus, the salience of mandatory arbitration increases in the wake of price-fixing 
agreements. This encourages price fixers to enter a secondary conspiracy to arbitrate. See 
infra Section II.C. 
 139. For example, for decades, safety was not salient in the automobile market. Lee 
Iacocca, the former President of Ford, famously asserted that consumers do not care about 
safety. Gary T. Schwartz, The Myth of the Ford Pinto Case, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 1013, 
1044 n.127 (1991) (“[H]aving announced his belief that ‘safety doesn’t sell,’ Iacocca 
authorized a set of criteria for the Pinto that included no reference to safety.”). But safety 
did become salient and is now a major selling feature of automobiles. It’s a Safety 
Marketplace, and Consumers are Buying, STATUS REPORT, (Ins. Inst. for Highway Safety, 
Highway Loss Data Inst., Arlington, VA), Apr. 15, 2010, at 1 http://www.iihs.org/iihs/sr
/statusreport/article/45/4/1 [https://perma.cc/H7HJ-S426]. One reason may be Volvo’s 
heavy comparative advertising on safety. See Gurjit Degun, Volvo Cars Looks to the 
Future of Safety in Global Campaign, CAMPAIGN (Feb. 16, 2016), 
http://www.campaignlive.com/article/volvo-cars-looks-future-safety-global-campaign/1383759 
[https://perma.cc/N9KW-3QE4]. 
 140. Patterson, supra note 129, at 333 (“But standardization among firms also 
eliminates competition on the standardized terms, adding market power to bargaining 
power and making it even less likely that the needs of all parties will be served.”); see also 
Thomas Wilhelmsson, Cooperation and Competition Regarding Standard Contract Terms 
in Consumer Contracts, 17 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 49, 49 (2006). 
 141. See Gilles, supra note 80, at 829. 
 142. See Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 431 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) 
(“Competitors often force obscure terms to salience in order to distinguish and market 
their products. For example, Capital One’s ‘No Hassle Rewards’ campaign drew attention 
to the fact that some of its competitors imposed conditions such as blackout dates that 
made redeeming rewards like frequent flyer miles difficult.” (citations omitted)). 
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problems with their competitors’ mandatory arbitration clauses.143 A 
conspiracy to arbitrate reduces the probability of arbitration clauses 
becoming salient because if all firms in a market agree to impose 
similar anti-consumer arbitration clauses, then no firm has an 
incentive to educate consumers in that market in order to get a 
competitive advantage. Consequently, firms may be motivated to 
conspire to arbitrate in order to prevent arbitration clauses from 
becoming salient in a given market.144 
2.  Harms of a Primary Conspiracy to Arbitrate 
The dangers of conspiracies to arbitrate are easily seen through 
the lens of antitrust law. Private plaintiffs bringing a section 1 claim 
under the Sherman Act must prove that they suffered antitrust injury, 
which is injury caused by a decrease in competition.145 In consumer-
initiated antitrust actions, increased price caused by collusion is the 
traditional form of antitrust injury, but other harms beyond increased 
price can also constitute antitrust injury.146 For example, an 
agreement among competitors to reduce quality and only sell inferior 
products inflicts antitrust injury.147 Some cases discuss conspiracies to 
arbitrate as a form of group boycott in which the conspirators have 
agreed to refuse to sell to customers who do not waive their right to 
litigate.148 
Primary conspiracies to arbitrate inflict antitrust injury because 
consumer contracts with arbitration clauses—especially those that 
include class-action waivers—are inferior products.149 In litigation 
 
 143. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 57. 
 144. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 431–32 (“Collusion can delay the rise to salience of product 
features that would normally become salient under competitive conditions.”). 
 145. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977); Louisa 
Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 804, 813 (E.D. 
Ky. 1999). 
 146. Blue Shield of Va. v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 482–83 (1982). 
 147. See Angelico v. Lehigh Valley Hosp., Inc., 184 F.3d 268, 276 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating 
that a deterioration in quality constitutes an anticompetitive effect). 
 148. See, e.g., Ross v. Bank of Am., N.A., 524 F.3d 217, 221 (2d Cir. 2008) (“The 
second claim alleges that the banks participated in a group boycott by refusing to issue 
cards to individuals who did not agree to arbitration, also in violation of Section 1.”). 
 149. Some might argue that the arbitration-burdened product is not inferior because it 
may cost less, as sellers could pass savings on in the form of lower prices. This argument is 
unpersuasive for several reasons. First, the competitive market would offer a mix of 
products, such that consumers could decide whether to pay less in exchange for waiving 
their right to litigate in court. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, REPAIRING A BROKEN SYSTEM: 
PROTECTING CONSUMERS IN DEBT COLLECTION LITIGATION AND ARBITRATION 44 
(July 2010), www.ftc.gov/os/2010/07/debtcollectionreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/KFR6-
VGZZ] (“For example, a consumer might be offered a ten percent interest rate without a 
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where plaintiffs alleged a conspiracy to arbitrate among banks that 
issue credit cards, one court explained that “[t]he mere existence of 
the clauses[] diminishes the cards’ value by foreclosing the 
opportunity for cardholders to go to court and address grievances 
through class action litigation.”150 By agreeing to impose mandatory 
arbitration, firms are agreeing not to compete on product quality.151 
Thus, consumers are injured by their inability to purchase the 
superior product.152 
Conspiracies to arbitrate also injure competition by reducing 
consumer choice. If all of the major players in a market require 
mandatory arbitration, consumers have less, or no, ability to choose a 
more consumer-friendly product.153 The Supreme Court has 
condemned horizontal agreements that limit “consumer choice by 
impeding the ‘ordinary give and take of the market place.’”154 
Professor Robert Lande has persuasively explained that “choice-
centered antitrust policy will support and lead to a more efficient 
market, the lowest prices, the best product quality and variety, the 
highest level of consumer surplus, and all the other benefits of a 
 
mandatory pre-dispute arbitration clause, or a nine and three-quarters percent rate with 
such a clause.”). 
  Second, and more importantly, much evidence indicates that any savings enjoyed 
by sellers is not passed on to consumers. See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, supra note 
46, §	1.4.9, at 18 (“That ‘difference-in-differences’ analysis did not identify any statistically 
significant evidence of an increase in prices among those companies that dropped their 
arbitration clauses and thus increased their exposure to class action litigation risk.”); Amy 
J. Schmitz, Curing Consumer Warranty Woes Through Regulated Arbitration, 23 OHIO ST. 
J. ON DISP. RESOL. 627, 660 (2008) (“My review of eleven major credit card companies’ 
[2007] contracts, for example, indicated that consumers do not necessarily enjoy lower 
interest rates, or APRs, if they accept arbitration clauses.”). 
  Finally, when the conspiracy to arbitrate is secondary to a price-fixing conspiracy, 
the sellers have already agreed not to bid the price down. 
 150. Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 151. See Ross, 524 F.3d at 224 (“[T]he alleged conspiracy to limit the cardholders to 
cards that require arbitration of disputes also diminished the present value of the cards 
offered to the cardholders. A card that limits the holder to arbitration is less valuable (all 
other factors being equal) than a card that offers the holder a choice between court action 
or arbitration.”). 
 152. How to quantify and monetize this injury could prove difficult. Malcolm A. 
Hoffman, Proof of Damages in Private Litigation, 36 ANTITRUST L.J. 151, 154 (1967) 
(discussing Momand v. Universal Film Exch., 172 F.2d 37 (1st Cir. 1948)). 
 153. See Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 434 (“It is undeniable that consumer choice was 
reduced when the seven Issuing Banks—who collectively held between 79-87% of the 
transaction volume and outstanding balances in the credit card market from 1999–2009—
each adopted a class-action-barring clause.”). 
 154. FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 459 (1986) (quoting National Soc’y of 
Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978)). 
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competitive economy.”155 Conspiracies to arbitrate prevent this 
market mechanism from working. This reduction in choice represents 
an injury to consumers.156 To the extent that conspiracies to arbitrate 
reduce competition regarding contract terms, antitrust law views them 
as harmful.157 
C. Conspiracy to Arbitrate as a Secondary Conspiracy 
A secondary conspiracy to arbitrate is an additional conspiracy 
beyond an initial antitrust conspiracy.158 One example is when firms 
first agree to form a price-fixing cartel and then also agree that each 
cartel member will impose mandatory arbitration clauses on its 
customers. While it would seem that adding a second conspiracy may 
increase the risk of being caught violating antitrust law, the second 
conspiracy helps insulate the first conspiracy from liability. This 
Section explains how, if rival firms are already fixing price, and thus 
already committing a felony, it makes sense to enter a secondary 
conspiracy—a conspiracy to arbitrate. Doing so will both limit the 
potential exposure from and strengthen the underlying price-fixing 
conspiracy. 
1.  Concealing an Underlying Conspiracy 
An arbitration conspiracy may help conceal the existence of the 
underlying price-fixing conspiracy by reducing pre-trial discovery. In 
the context of antitrust litigation, discovery limitations will generally 
favor defendants.159 If the defendants can stem the flow of documents, 
they increase their probability of victory. As one court explained, 
“the heart of any American antitrust case is the discovery of business 
 
 155. Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 503, 504 (2001) (footnotes omitted). 
 156. See Ross, 524 F.3d at 223 (“The cardholders have adequately alleged antitrust 
injuries in fact .	.	.	. The Complaint alleges that reduced choice and diminished quality in 
credit services result directly from the banks’ illegal collusion to constrict the options 
available to cardholders.”). 
 157. Discussing contract standardization more generally, Professor Mark Patterson 
argues that “the absence of negative effects overall does not matter, because elimination 
of competition on any term is an antitrust violation.” Patterson, supra note 129, at 409–10 
(2010) (citing Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 650 (1980) (per curiam)). 
 158. As with a primary conspiracy to arbitrate, a secondary conspiracy to arbitrate 
could be as simple as agreeing to impose arbitration clauses on all consumers. 
Alternatively, it could be more detailed and include agreements to standardize the terms 
of arbitration clauses. These standardized terms could include class-action waivers, anti-
injunction clauses, damage limitations, and shortened statutes of limitations. 
 159. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 15–16. 
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documents. Without them, there is virtually no case.”160 Because 
antitrust plaintiffs generally require more evidence than do antitrust 
defendants, “discovery restrictions asymmetrically benefit antitrust 
violators over their victims.”161 Arbitration generally provides 
significantly less discovery than does traditional litigation.162 
Consequently, price-fixing conspirators can stem the flow of 
documents by both forcing antitrust plaintiffs into arbitration and 
then drafting their uniform arbitration clauses to explicitly limit 
discovery. By removing victims of price fixing from federal court and 
constraining discovery in arbitration, a secondary conspiracy to 
arbitrate allows price fixers to prevent antitrust plaintiffs from getting 
the discovery they need to prove the existence of the underlying 
price-fixing conspiracy. Thus, both conspiracies are less likely to be 
discovered. 
2.  Undermining Pro-Plaintiff Aspects of Antitrust Law 
Antitrust law contains several pro-plaintiff policies designed to 
encourage private plaintiffs to pursue antitrust litigation. These 
include automatic treble damages and attorneys’ fees for successful 
plaintiffs, a relatively long statute of limitations, and the ability to 
bring class-action litigation. Price-fixing conspirators may design their 
arbitration clauses to undermine these pro-plaintiff aspects of 
antitrust law. This Section explains how a secondary conspiracy to 
arbitrate can dismantle the consumer protections in antitrust law’s 
statutory design. 
Treble Damages. Outside of some narrow statutory exceptions, 
federal judges must triple a successful antitrust plaintiff’s damages; 
jurists have no discretion.163 These mandatory treble damages serve 
three related goals. First, trebling damages strengthens deterrence.164 
Given the fact that antitrust conspiracies are clandestine and difficult 
to detect and to successfully sue over,165 awarding mere single 
damages would make price fixing net profitable.166 Second, treble 
 
 160. In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (N.D. Ill. 1979). 
 161. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 16. 
 162. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. 
 163. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 47 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 164. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 635 
(1985) (citing Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. Int’l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 138–39 (1968)). 
 165. Christopher R. Leslie, Cartels, Agency Costs, and Finding Virtue in Faithless 
Agents, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1621, 1634 (2008); see also John Gibeaut, Antitrust 
American Style, A.B.A. J., Apr. 2004, at 55, 56. 
 166. Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Toward an Empirical and Theoretical 
Assessment of Private Antitrust Enforcement, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1269, 1312 (2013); 
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damages also better “compensate victims of antitrust violations for 
their injuries,”167 especially in light of the fact that antitrust litigation 
is often protracted.168 Third, treble damages “encourage private 
enforcement of the anti-trust laws,”169 which is important because 
antitrust law is public interest law.170 In sum, treble damages are a 
critical feature of America’s antitrust regime. 
Price-fixing cartels have a strong incentive to conspire to use 
mandatory arbitration clauses to dismantle the antitrust treble 
damage scheme. Many firms have attempted to use arbitration 
clauses as a means to de-treble antitrust damages.171 It remains 
unclear whether these efforts will succeed.172 The Supreme Court has 
not ruled definitively on the issue,173 but the Court has held that it is 
for the arbiter—not the federal judge—to decide whether an 
ambiguous arbitration clause limits the mandatory trebling provision 
of a governing statute.174 Lower courts have suggested that arbiters 
possess the authority to strike or uphold a damage-limitation 
provision in an arbitration clause.175 This would seem to confer upon 
arbiters the power to de-treble antitrust damages, a prerogative 
 
Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble” Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO 
STATE L.J. 115, 134–36 (1993); Christopher R. Leslie, De Facto Detrebling: The Rush to 
Settlement in Antitrust Class Action Litigation, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 1009, 1039 (2008) (“As 
long as a firm enjoys a non-negligible chance of evading responsibility, violating antitrust 
laws appears rational: if not caught, the firm secures illegal profits, and, if caught, it simply 
returns the ill-gotten gains.”). 
 167. Ill. Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 746 (1977). 
 168. See, e.g., Richard Posner, A Statistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & 
ECON. 365, 374–81 (1970) (discussing the protracted length of public and private antitrust 
litigation); see also JOHN M. CONNOR, GLOBAL PRICE FIXING 532–33 (2001). 
 169. Pollock & Riley, Inc. v. Pearl Brewing Co., 498 F.2d 1240, 1242–43 (5th Cir. 1974) 
(citing Bruce’s Juices, Inc. v. Am. Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751–52 (1947)). 
 170. See Christopher R. Leslie, Antitrust Law as Public Interest Law, 2 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 885, 885 (2012); see also Shearson/Am. Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 241 
(1987) (“Antitrust violations generally have a widespread impact on national markets as a 
whole, and the antitrust treble-damages provision gives private parties an incentive to 
bring civil suits that serve to advance the national interest in a competitive economy.”). 
 171. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 24–25 (citing examples). 
 172. Cf. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 46 (1st Cir. 2006) (“[U]nder federal 
law, the remedies provided by the antitrust statute cannot be contractually waived.”); 
James C. Justice Cos. v. Deere & Co., No. 5:06-cv-00287, 2008 WL 828923, at *4 (S.D. W. 
Va. Mar. 27, 2008) (“[T]reble damages as provided for in the Sherman Act is a non-
waivable substantive right.”); Baker & Stabile, supra note 51, at 410 n.85 (“It is not clear 
whether arbitration tribunals are obliged to award mandatory treble damages by virtue of 
the Clayton Act.”). 
 173. Kristian, 446 F.3d at 47–48 (“There is no Supreme Court precedent that speaks 
directly to the question of whether treble damages under federal antitrust law may be 
waived by contract.”). 
 174. PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401, 407 n.2 (2003). 
 175. See Larry’s United Super, Inc. v. Werries, 253 F.3d 1083, 1085–86 (8th Cir. 2001). 
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denied to federal judges.176 If price fixers can de-treble damages 
through a secondary conspiracy to arbitrate, they can significantly 
reduce the incentives for consumers to investigate and bring antitrust 
claims and can dramatically increase the expected value of their 
illegal price-fixing activities, which undermines deterrence. In 
essence, price fixers can use a conspiracy to arbitrate to effectively 
repeal the Sherman Act’s provision of mandatory treble damages. 
Injunctive Relief. Price fixers may wish to use an arbitration 
conspiracy to preclude any injunctions against their interests. 
Antitrust courts can award successful plaintiffs injunctive relief177 to 
achieve three goals: “(1) putting an end to illegal conduct, (2) 
depriving violators of the benefits of their illegal conduct, and (3) 
restoring competition in the marketplace.”178 Federal judges fashion 
antitrust injunctions to eliminate the “lingering effects” of antitrust 
violations.179 Injunctive relief is important in many antitrust cases,180 
particularly when the plaintiff is trying to prevent anticompetitive 
injury before it occurs.181 
Through a conspiracy to arbitrate, antitrust violators may draft 
arbitration clauses that deny arbiters the authority to grant injunctive 
relief.182 If every firm in a market imposes an arbitration clause with 
an anti-injunction provision, consumers may be unable to preserve 
their right to seek injunctions. Then, antitrust violators will have 
effectively immunized themselves against a potent remedy. 
 
 176. Robert Pitofsky, Arbitration and Antitrust Enforcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1072, 
1079 (1969) (discussing antitrust law “provisions calling for mandatory treble damages and 
attorney’s fees for the plaintiff” and noting that “[i]n the ordinary commercial arbitration, 
neither of those statutory provisions would be binding on the arbitrator”); Eric James 
Fuglsang, Comment, Arbitrability of Domestic Antitrust Disputes: Where Does the Law 
Stand?, 46 DEPAUL L. REV. 779, 815 (1997) (“Because arbitration is designed primarily to 
reach a fair settlement or compromise between the parties, arbitrators are more likely to 
award only actual damages rather than the statutorily mandated treble damages.”); see 
also Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 25–27. 
 177. 15 U.S.C. §	26 (2012) (permitting both the government and private plaintiffs to 
request injunctions to remedy antitrust violations). 
 178. Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1059 (6th Cir. 
1984) (quoting In re Multidistrict Vehicle Air Pollution, 538 F.2d 231, 234 (9th Cir. 1976)). 
 179. See, e.g., Wilk v. Am. Med. Ass’n, 895 F.2d 352, 366 (7th Cir. 1990). 
 180. See In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 192 F.R.D. 68, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 
2000) (finding antitrust action qualified for class certification “[b]ecause the highly 
significant injunctive relief sought here is as important as the damages claimed”). 
 181. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 130 (1969) (stating 
that injunctive relief “is characteristically available even though the plaintiff has not yet 
suffered actual injury”). 
 182. James J. Calder et al., A New Alternative to Antitrust Litigation: Arbitration of 
Antitrust Disputes, Spring 1989 ANTITRUST 18, 19–20 (“Parties to an arbitration generally 
.	.	. can limit the remedies available to the arbitrator.”). 
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Fee Shifting. Antitrust law provides for one-way fee shifting in 
which the successful private plaintiff—but not the successful 
defendant—is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs.183 Like 
the trebling of antitrust damages, courts are required to award 
successful antitrust plaintiffs their attorneys’ fees.184 Federal courts 
have explained that this pro-plaintiff, one-sided fee shifting “both 
encourages ‘private prosecution of antitrust violations by insulating 
plaintiffs’ treble damage recoveries from the expense of legal fees,’ 
and deters violation of the antitrust laws by requiring a losing 
defendant to pay the plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees ‘as part of his penalty 
for having violated the antitrust laws.’”185 Pro-plaintiff fee shifting is 
particularly important in antitrust cases in which only injunctive relief 
is sought because “without the shifting of attorneys’ fees, a plaintiff 
with a deserving case would personally have to pay the very high 
price of obtaining judicial enforcement of the law . . . . A prevailing 
plaintiff should not have to bear such an expense.”186 Absent this fee-
shifting provision, plaintiffs in some cases may properly conclude that 
the cost of pursuing meritorious antitrust litigation is not worth the 
benefit.187 If so, antitrust violations become more profitable and, thus, 
more likely. 
By drafting their arbitration clauses to override antitrust law’s 
pro-plaintiff, one-way fee-shifting requirement, antitrust defendants 
may be able to nullify antitrust law’s fee-shifting mandate.188 Some 
commentators have argued that arbiters are not compelled to follow 
antitrust law’s statutory mandate of fee awards to a prevailing 
 
 183. 15 U.S.C. §	15(a) (2012). 
 184. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc’y, 421 U.S. 240, 261 (1975) (“Under 
the antitrust laws, .	.	. allowance of attorneys’ fees to a plaintiff awarded treble damages is 
mandatory.”). 
 185. Sciambra v. Graham News, 892 F.2d 411, 416 (5th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted) 
(first quoting Home Placement Serv. v. Providence Journal Co., 819 F.2d 1199, 1210 (1st 
Cir. 1987); then quoting Farmington Dowel Prods. Co. v. Forster Mfg., 421 F.2d 61, 91 (1st 
Cir. 1970)). 
 186. F. & M. Schaefer Corp. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 476 F. Supp. 203, 205 n.1 
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 94-499, at 19 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2572, 2589). 
 187. Donald I. Baker, Revisiting History—What Have We Learned About Private 
Antitrust Enforcement That We Would Recommend to Others?, 16 LOY. CONSUMER L. 
REV. 379, 386 (2004) (“[T]he one-way cost rule seems most important in equity cases 
under Section 16 of the Clayton Act. The fact that such a plaintiff can recover costs is 
definitely an incentive to seek an injunction.”); Lemley & Leslie, supra note 42, at 31. 
 188. For example, some arbitration clauses replace one-way fee-shifting with a two-
way provision that requires the unsuccessful antitrust plaintiff to pay the defendants’ costs. 
See, e.g., In re Pharmacy Benefit Managers Antitrust Litig., 700 F.3d 109, 112 (3d Cir. 
2012). 
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plaintiff.189 And some courts have upheld arbitration clauses that 
preclude an arbiter from awarding attorneys’ fees to a successful 
antitrust plaintiff.190 By conspiring to impose arbitration clauses that 
prohibit pro-plaintiff fee shifting, antitrust defendants can reduce the 
amount of their exposure and reduce the incentive for antitrust 
plaintiffs to bring claims at all. This conspiracy to arbitrate 
strengthens the underlying price-fixing conspiracy. 
Statute of Limitations. Antitrust law has a four-year statute of 
limitations.191 Many firms have attempted to shorten this limitations 
period through arbitration clauses.192 Because of the judicial 
deference to both arbitration provisions and their terms, federal 
judges have allowed antitrust defendants to use these clauses to 
truncate the four-year statute of limitations to one or two years.193 As 
a matter of law, this is a mistake.194 
By using a secondary arbitration conspiracy to truncate the 
statute of limitations, price fixers can protect their primary conspiracy 
to fix prices. First, a truncated statute of limitations gives antitrust 
plaintiffs less time to unearth a sufficient amount of compelling 
evidence to survive preliminary motions and to prove their cases to 
the arbiter.195 Second, by manipulating the statute of limitations, firms 
can reduce the plaintiff’s available damages. In general, a plaintiff 
who could recover for four years of cartel overcharges in court will 
only be able to recover for one year of cartel overcharges in 
arbitration if the defendant has inserted a one-year limitations period 
 
 189. See Baker & Stabile, supra note 51, at 428 (suggesting that “the arbitrator might 
be given broad discretion to allocate fees and costs”). 
 190. See, e.g., James C. Justice Cos. v. Deere & Co., No. 5:06-cv-00287, 2008 WL 
828923, at *5 (S.D. W. Va. Mar. 27, 2008) (“Court cannot conclude that the Dealership 
Agreement’s limitation on attorney’s fees and costs is inconsistent with the policies of the 
Sherman Act.”). 
 191. See 15 U.S.C. §	15b (2012). 
 192. See, e.g., In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d 274, 287 (4th Cir. 2007); 
Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 43 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 193. Buffon & Wolson, supra note 51, at 35 (“Thus, an arbitration agreement that 
requires the parties to file their claim within one year after becoming aware of a claim has 
been held enforceable, even when the statute of limitations period would otherwise be 
longer.” (citing Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 2d 815, 826–27 (S.D. Ohio 
1999))); see, e.g., James C. Justice, 2008 WL 828923, at *5. 
 194. Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 33–34 (condemning the argument that antitrust 
law’s four-year statute of limitations is procedural, not substantive, and therefore subject 
to contractual shortening). 
 195. See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556–57 (2007) (requiring antitrust 
plantiffs to gather facts beyond “an allegation of parallel conduct, and a bare assertion of 
conspiracy” to survive a motion to dismiss). Arbitrators, too, can grant dispositive “pre-
trial” motions. 
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in the parties’ arbitration clause.196 This effectively slashes damages 
by three-quarters, which undercuts both the compensatory and 
deterrent functions of antitrust law.197 
Class-Action Waivers. Class-action litigation is often necessary to 
remedy antitrust violations. Given the number of victims, and thus 
potential plaintiffs, of an antitrust conspiracy, “a class action is not 
only the most efficient and convenient method to resolve this 
controversy[;] it is the only ‘fair’ and ‘efficient’ means to adjudicate 
this controversy.”198 In many cases, no plaintiff is likely to have 
suffered sufficient injury to make initiating individual action cost-
effective.199 Because individual victims of antitrust violations do not 
sue, compensation is denied. And because price fixers retain their 
illegal profits, deterrence is extinguished.200 
The members of a price-fixing conspiracy can exempt themselves 
from class litigation by agreeing that each cartel member will impose 
an arbitration clause that includes a class-action waiver. If the 
expected costs exceed the maximum recovery, as in Italian Colors, 
then no individual victim of the cartel will have sufficient financial 
incentives to sue any member of the conspiracy.201 As a result, 
through the collusive use of class-action waivers in arbitration clauses, 
price fixers may effectively immunize themselves from private 
antitrust liability altogether. 
Summary. Although a firm could unilaterally insert the above 
anti-consumer terms into its arbitration clauses, it may make more 
sense for firms in a price-fixing conspiracy to collude to impose 
arbitration clauses with standardized anti-consumer terms. Similar to 
the dynamics of a primary conspiracy to arbitrate, a firm does not 
want to be the only one to impose anti-consumer terms in its 
 
 196. In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litig., 505 F.3d at 299–300 (Johnston, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (“[W]hile the Antitrust Act effectively requires a four year 
look-back period, the contract at issue would only allow the arbitrator to consider one 
year of anti-competitive behavior.”). 
 197. See Lemley & Leslie, supra note 45, at 34–35. 
 198. In re NASDAQ Market-Makers Antitrust Litig., 169 F.R.D. 493, 527 (S.D.N.Y. 
1996). 
 199. See id. at 527 (“Moreover, although a large number of individuals may have been 
injured, no one person may have been damaged to a degree which would induce him to 
institute litigation solely on his own behalf.” (citing	Green v. Wolf Corp.,	406 F.2d 291, 296 
(2d Cir. 1968))). 
 200. Cf. Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion Impedes 
Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 725 (2012) (“If we allow companies to insulate 
themselves from class actions, we are effectively allowing companies to escape many legal 
regulations and thereby eliminating a great deterrent to company misconduct.”). 
 201. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2316 (2013) (Kagan, 
J., dissenting). 
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contracts.202 The conspiracy to arbitrate eliminates each firm’s fear of 
being a first mover. If every firm requires similar anti-consumer 
terms, no firm will lose business to a more pro-consumer rival. More 
importantly, if every cartel member imposes the same de-trebling, 
anti-injunction, anti-fee-shifting, and reduced statute of limitations 
provisions, along with class-action waivers, then the entire cartel is 
protected—the antitrust violators will have effectively rewritten the 
antitrust statutes. 
3.  Alleviating Settlement Pressure 
A secondary conspiracy to arbitrate also relieves the pressure to 
settle price-fixing litigation. Each individual firm in a price-fixing 
conspiracy risks significant antitrust damages in litigation. Antitrust 
law provides for joint and several liability,203 which makes every 
participant in an illegal cartel liable for the overcharges of its cartel 
partners.204 A consumer who pays an illegally elevated cartel price can 
choose whom to sue: the firm from which it purchased the product, 
another cartel member, or all of the cartel members.205 Because 
antitrust damages are automatically trebled, the victims of a price-
fixing conspiracy can sue a single cartel member for three times the 
value of the entire cartel’s overcharges. Furthermore, antitrust law 
denies defendants any right to contribution.206 Thus, a price-fixing 
firm could be sued for treble the amount of all cartel profits and yet 
be unable to recover anything from its co-conspirators.207 
This joint and several liability—without a right to contribution—
creates a dynamic that favors antitrust plaintiffs. Although bringing 
an antitrust lawsuit requires significant outlays, antitrust plaintiffs 
may be able to use early settlements to secure their funding from the 
defendants themselves. In price-fixing cases against multiple cartel 
 
 202. This is particularly true in a market marked by price fixing; when firms are all 
charging the same price, non-price terms may become more salient to consumers. With 
price removed as a variable for consumer decision-making, customers may be more likely 
to focus on, and purchase from, the firm that does not impose mandatory arbitration or 
does not load its arbitration clause with other remedy-reducing provisions. 
 203. Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897, 904 n.15 (5th 
Cir. 1979). 
 204. Dee-K Enters., Inc. v. Heveafil Sdn. Bhd., 982 F. Supp. 1138, 1155 (E.D. Va. 
1997). 
 205. Walker Distrib. Co. v. Lucky Lager Brewing Co., 323 F.2d 1, 8 (9th Cir. 1963) (“A 
plaintiff need not sue all conspirators; he may choose to sue but one.”). 
 206. Tex. Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981). 
 207. Edward D. Cavanagh, Contribution, Claim Reduction, and Individual Treble 
Damage Responsibility: Which Path to Reform of Antitrust Remedies?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 
1277, 1284 (1987). 
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members, each defendant has an incentive to settle early because the 
initial settlers can generally buy repose relatively cheaply. Antitrust 
plaintiffs may find it rational to allow a defendant to exit the litigation 
in exchange for a modest amount of money and admissible evidence 
against the remaining defendants. The plaintiff knows that it can still 
recover all of its damages from the as-of-yet non-settling defendants 
because of antitrust law’s joint and several liability, and early 
settlements give the plaintiff more evidence and more leverage 
against the remaining defendants.208 Consequently, later-settling 
antitrust defendants often pay relatively more than early-settling 
defendants,209 which increases the ex ante pressure to settle early and 
to sell out one’s cartel partners by supplying evidence to the plaintiffs. 
Antitrust plaintiffs may seize on this dynamic by announcing that 
later settlements will have “progressively higher rates” and may make 
this threat credible by including most-favored-nation clauses in all 
settlement agreements.210 This tactic ensures the later-settling 
defendants cannot receive more favorable settlement terms than the 
earlier-settling defendants. Because the non-settling defendants face 
relatively higher exposure and the plaintiffs’ case against them grows 
stronger as the plaintiffs acquire additional evidence from each 
settling defendant,211 antitrust defendants “may compete against each 
 
 208. Christopher R. Leslie, Judgment-Sharing Agreements, 58 DUKE L.J. 747, 777 
(2009). 
 209. See, e.g., In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., Nos. 94 C 897, 
MDL 997, 1995 WL 221853, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 11, 1995) (“The plaintiffs ‘take small 
amounts .	.	. at the beginning of the settlement process’ and larger amounts as time 
progresses.” (quoting Senate testimony of Stephen D. Susman)); Cavanagh, supra note 
207, at 1288 n.67 (providing settlement figures in corrugated container litigation indicating 
that defendants who settled later paid more); see also Antitrust Damage Allocation: 
Hearings Before Subcomm. on Monopolies and Commercial Law of H. Comm. on 
Judiciary, 97th Cong. 37–38 (1982) [hereinafter Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings] 
(statement of Denis McInerney, Esquire, Cahill, Gordon & Reindel) (“Consequently, it 
has become commonplace for late-settling defendants to be forced to contribute to 
settlements in amounts wholly disproportionate to their percentage of the questioned sales 
.	.	.	.”). 
 210. Leslie, supra note 208, at 758; see A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH 
NO. 11, CONTRIBUTION AND CLAIM REDUCTION IN ANTITRUST LITIGATION 15–16 
(1986) (“In fact, the plaintiffs openly announced that each settlement in the case would be 
at progressively higher rates, and each settlement agreement contained a ‘most favored 
nation clause’ that assured that succeeding settlements would be no more favorable.”); see 
also Antitrust Damage Allocation Hearings, supra note 209, at 37–38 (statement of Denis 
McInerney, Esquire, Cahill, Gordon & Reindel). 
 211. John Cirace, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Contribution and Claim Reduction in 
Antitrust Treble Damage Suits, 55 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 42, 45 (1980) (“In general, whenever 
a defendant settles with the plaintiff for a sum less than three times the damages 
attributable to its acts, each remaining defendant faces an increased risk that it will be 
forced to bear more than its proportionate share of the damages.”). 
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other to reach an early settlement so as not to be one of the last 
remaining defendants who pays a disproportionately large share of 
the damages.”212 Many antitrust defendants try to alleviate this 
settlement pressure by contracting with each other.213 
Conspiracies to arbitrate provide a mechanism for price-fixers to 
reduce the pressure to settle by staying out of federal court 
altogether. By forcing their victims into arbitration, price fixers may 
not have to enter settlements at all because no individual victim may 
find it financially feasible to pursue arbitration.214 This strategy 
diminishes an antitrust defendant’s incentive to trade evidence of 
price-fixing in exchange for an early settlement. However, in order to 
avoid federal court and the subsequent settlement pressure, it is 
insufficient for an individual price-fixing firm to impose mandatory 
arbitration clauses only on its own customers. Because of antitrust 
law’s joint and several liability, that price-fixing firm could be sued by 
its co-conspirators’ customers as well. Thus, each cartel member 
needs all of its co-conspirators to impose similar arbitration clauses 
on their customers, too. If one firm in the cartel does not impose 
mandatory arbitration, then that firm’s customers could sue any and 
all members of the cartel for treble damages, and those antitrust 
defendants will have an incentive to expose the cartel in exchange for 
a relatively small settlement payment. A conspiracy to arbitrate can 
reduce defendants’ rush to settle antitrust litigation by ensuring that 
all victims of the price-fixing conspiracy are denied access to courts. 
This secondary conspiracy eliminates the pressure to settle, and, 
consequently, protects the cartel. 
 
 212. A.B.A. ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 210, at 15 (“Thus, a competition 
develops among defendants to settle early in the case, when plaintiffs need money and 
settlements are cheap, which reduces the pool of remaining defendants and thereby 
further fuels the impetus to settle quickly.”); see WILLIAM BREIT & KENNETH G. 
ELZINGA, ANTITRUST PENALTY REFORM: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 29 (1986) (noting 
“great pressure on a defendant to settle early so as not to be exposed to the lion’s share of 
the joint trebled damages”); Yosef J. Riemer, Note, Sharing Agreements Among 
Defendants in Antitrust Cases, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 289, 293–94 (1984). 
 213. Leslie, supra note 208, at 758–64 (detailing how price-fixing defendants have 
sought to mitigate the pressure to settle by entering into judgment-sharing agreements, 
contracts by which antitrust co-defendants agree in advance what their relative 
responsibility will be for antitrust damages attributed to their cartel activity). 
 214. Including a class-action waiver in these collusive arbitration clauses that prevents 
class-wide arbitration can make arbitration prohibitively expensive for individual plaintiffs 
and, thus, no member of the price-fixing conspiracy will be held accountable. 
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4.  Adding a Net Beneficial, Relatively Minor Conspiracy 
Given all of the complicated components of a price-fixing 
arrangement, the addition of a conspiracy to arbitrate is relatively 
minor. Price fixing is more complicated than simply setting a single 
fixed price and then collecting cartel profits. Cartel members will 
often have different profit-maximizing prices.215 For example, firms 
may have different cost structures, and more efficient firms may 
maximize profits at a lower cartel price than firms with higher costs.216 
Even firms with similar cost structures may disagree about what price 
to charge, as some risk-averse firms may worry that setting price too 
high would attract entry into the market.217 Furthermore, many cartels 
have to fix multiple prices, depending on the characteristics of the 
customers or the product lines involved.218 
In addition to price considerations, many cartels limit the output, 
sales, and even working hours of their member firms.219 Cartels that 
limit total production must then negotiate each firm’s individual 
market share.220 Moreover, all of the above agreements need to be 
renegotiated continually as the market conditions change.221 
Compared to other aspects of cartelization, a secondary 
conspiracy to arbitrate is relatively simple. The parties are unlikely to 
have different profit-maximizing arbitration terms. They all benefit 
from mandatory arbitration provisions and from class-action waivers, 
as well as from limiting discovery, shortening statutes of limitations, 
banning injunctive relief, and eliminating pro-plaintiff fee shifting. 
Furthermore, the conspirators need not meet regularly in order to 
renegotiate the arbitration clause terms among themselves. Once they 
 
 215. Herbert Hovenkamp & Christopher R. Leslie, The Firm as Cartel Manager, 64 
VAND. L. REV. 813, 826 (2011). 
 216. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY: THE LAW OF 
COMPETITION AND ITS PRACTICE §4.1, at 193–94 (5th ed. 2016); see also James M. 
Griffin, Previous Cartel Experience: Any Lessons For OPEC?, in ECONOMICS IN THEORY 
AND PRACTICE: AN ECLECTIC APPROACH 179 (Lawrence R. Klein & Jaime Marquez 
eds., 1989). 
 217. This is essentially limit pricing. 
 218. Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 215, at 827–28; see Joseph E. Harrington, How 
Do Cartels Operate?, 2 FOUND. & TRENDS MICROECONOMICS 1, 14–16 (2006) (discussing 
citric acid and plasterboard cartels). 
 219. See, e.g., SIMON N. WHITNEY, TRADE ASSOCIATIONS AND INDUSTRIAL 
CONTROL 70–71 (1934) (discussing the cotton cartel and noting that Cotton-Textile 
Institute capped its members’ workweek to fifty-five hours per week for day shifts and 
fifty for night shifts). 
 220. See, e.g., United States v. Andreas, 216 F.3d 645, 652–53 (7th Cir. 2000) (discussing 
volume allocation in the lysine cartel). 
 221. Hovenkamp & Leslie, supra note 215, at 833–34. 
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have each imposed their arbitration clauses, they need not discuss the 
issue again.222 As a result, the conspiracy-to-arbitrate component of a 
larger price-fixing conspiracy has a relatively high incremental benefit 
but a relatively low incremental cost. 
5.  Summary 
Private enforcement of antitrust laws is designed to deter and 
punish cartel behavior. Price fixers, however, would like to prevent 
these private actions. In order to reduce the risk of antitrust liability, 
conspirators would like to preclude their victims from suing in federal 
court, to eliminate treble damages, to reduce the time window for 
which damages are recoverable, and to prevent injunctive relief. 
Antitrust conspirators may be able to achieve these goals through 
industry-wide mandatory arbitration. Especially in the wake of Italian 
Colors,223 a conspiracy to arbitrate may allow price-fixing firms to 
prevent class-action litigation and class-wide arbitration, to make the 
expected cost of individual arbitration exceed its benefits, and, thus, 
to essentially agree to eliminate private antitrust lawsuits against 
members of the conspiracy. Given all of these benefits, it should 
constitute cartel malpractice not to include a secondary conspiracy to 
arbitrate.224 
III.  JUDICIAL FACILITATION OF CONSPIRACIES TO ARBITRATE 
Because conspiracies to arbitrate can inflict significant 
anticompetitive harm—and are per se illegal—the legal system should 
be designed to detect and to penalize such conspiracies. Courts, 
however, have constructed a legal regime that effectively protects 
conspiracies to arbitrate. This Part explains how courts have 
incentivized conspiracies to arbitrate, even while acknowledging that 
such agreements violate antitrust law. 
 
 222. See infra note 311–12 and accompanying text (discussing example of an 
“arbitration coalition” of rival banks disbanding after all of the firms imposed arbitration 
agreements on their customers). 
 223. Before Italian Colors, some courts had applied the Effective Vindication Doctrine 
to hold antitrust claims to be not subject to arbitration. See, e.g., In re Elec. Books 
Antitrust Litig., No. 11 MD 2293 (DLC), 2012 WL 2478462, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. June 27, 2012) 
(holding arbitration agreements to be “invalid as to plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claims because 
the plaintiffs have established that the agreements would prevent them from effectively 
vindicating their rights under the Sherman Act”). 
 224. Cf. J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive Law, 124 
YALE L.J. 3052, 3081 (2015) (“Indeed, after Italian Colors, it would be irrational for legal 
advisors not to insulate their corporate clients from private enforcement of substantive 
laws in the ways permitted under the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence.”). 
96 N.C. L. REV. 381 (2018) 
424 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96 
A. Supreme Court Arbitration Jurisprudence as the Catalyst for 
Conspiracies to Arbitrate 
In the half-century following the Supreme Court’s condemnation 
of conspiracies to arbitrate in Paramount Famous Lasky in 1930, such 
collusion does not seem to have been a recurring problem. One 
explanation is that competitors did not conspire to impose arbitration 
clauses on their customers because the Court had rendered such 
agreements among competitors illegal. This law-abidance explanation 
is contradicted by the fact that competitors continued to fix prices 
after the Supreme Court held that price-fixing conspiracies were per 
se illegal.225 The lack of conspiracies to arbitrate is probably a 
function of the limited reach of arbitration clauses until the 1980s. 
Although the FAA made arbitration agreements between merchants 
enforceable,226 Congress did not intend the FAA to apply to 
consumer contracts, especially contracts of adhesion, or to federal 
statutory claims, like antitrust.227 Because arbitration clauses were not 
the pro-business devices that they have become, firms had little 
incentive to insert arbitration clauses in their consumer contracts 
either unilaterally or conspiratorially. 
The Supreme Court set the stage for conspiracies to arbitrate in 
the mid-1980s when it—incorrectly—asserted that the FAA 
embodied a federal policy favoring the enforcement of all manner of 
mandatory arbitration provisions.228 The Supreme Court’s incorrect 
claim of a congressional policy favoring arbitration makes primary 
conspiracies to arbitrate rational. Its pro-arbitration decisions created 
the legal environment necessary for arbitration conspiracies to thrive. 
Until consumer claims were subject to arbitration, firms had no 
incentive to unilaterally insert mandatory arbitration provisions in 
their consumer contracts. Similarly, they had no incentive to collude 
to impose such terms. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s arbitration jurisprudence 
made secondary conspiracies to arbitrate irresistible. When the 
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Solar Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.229 Court 
 
 225. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 (1940) (finding a 
price-fixing scheme existed in the midwestern oil market). 
 226. Arbitration Hearings, supra note 17, at 10 (statement of W. H. H. Piatt, Chairman 
of the Comm. of Commerce, Trade and Commercial Law, ABA) (providing that the FAA 
was designed for disputes involving “a contract between merchants one with another, 
buying and selling goods” (emphasis added)). 
 227. See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
 228. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
 229. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
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held that antitrust claims were arbitrable, it never considered how 
such a rule would affect consumers who sought to recover for being 
overcharged by a cartel.230 A legal rule that allows price-fixing claims 
to be channeled into arbitration rewards price fixers who include 
arbitration clauses in their contracts with customers.231 If antitrust 
claims were not arbitrable, price fixers would have no reason to enter 
a secondary conspiracy to arbitrate. Price fixers would be unable to 
use arbitration clauses as a mechanism to de-treble damages, prevent 
injunctions, shorten statutes of limitation, or preclude class actions. 
In sum, conspiracies to arbitrate were not particularly profitable 
until courts began enforcing arbitration clauses in consumer contracts 
and subjecting statutory claims to mandatory arbitration. These 
changes in arbitration jurisprudence incentivized competitors to 
conspire to impose arbitration clauses on consumers. But for the 
Supreme Court’s pro-arbitration jurisprudence, antitrust violators 
would not be able to employ arbitration conspiracies to deny their 
customers access to courts, to prevent class actions, and to undermine 
the pro-plaintiff aspects of antitrust law. 
B. Judicial Enforcement of Conspiracies to Arbitrate 
Antitrust conspiracies face two major challenges: maximizing the 
likelihood of their agreement being enforced and minimizing the risk 
of antitrust liability.232 Enforcement is important because if their 
agreement goes unenforced, the colluding firms will not attain the 
goals of their conspiracy. For example, because price-fixing 
agreements are not enforceable in court, when cartels cannot perfect 
a private enforcement mechanism, they are likely to be unstable and 
collapse into competition.233 Still, even failed cartels violate antitrust 
law, and if the conspirators are held liable, the antitrust damages 
could be high. The prospect of trebled damages may deter many 
would-be cartelists from conspiring with their competitors.234 In the 
 
 230. See id. at 617, 619–20 (dealing with antitrust claims based on alleged wrongful 
termination of dealership). 
 231. See supra Section II.C. 
 232. Enforcement issues affect the expected benefits of conspiring while the 
probability of antitrust liability goes to the expected costs of conspiring. If the latter 
outweigh the former, then a rational firm would decline to collude. 
 233. See Christopher R. Leslie, Trust, Distrust, and Antitrust, 82 TEX. L. REV. 515, 632–
34 (2004). The enforcement conundrum in traditional price-fixing conspiracies involves 
the risk that cartel members will cheat on the cartel agreement by charging a lower price 
(and/or selling more than their cartel allotment), and the non-cheating cartel members will 
have no ability to enforce their price-fixing agreement and to punish the cheater. 
 234. This is especially true if the firms conclude that an unenforceable cartel agreement 
is unlikely to generate significant long-term profits. 
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context of conspiracies to arbitrate, the enforcement conundrum has 
an additional facet; even if all of the conspiracy’s members abide by 
their agreement and impose arbitration clauses on their customers, 
the conspirators still need the cooperation of federal judges. If judges 
do not enforce the conspiracy-instigated arbitration clauses, then the 
conspiracy cannot achieve its goals. 
Some courts have approached the issue of conspiracies to 
arbitrate in a manner that solves this aspect of the conspirators’ 
enforcement problem. When customers suspect that they have signed 
contracts with mandatory arbitration provisions that were the product 
of a conspiracy among the sellers in the relevant market, they may file 
an antitrust complaint in federal court. The antitrust defendants then 
inevitably respond by moving to compel arbitration because forcing 
their victims into arbitration was the whole point of conspiring to 
impose arbitration clauses in the first place. If a federal court grants 
the defendants’ motion to compel arbitration, the judge is essentially 
enforcing the underlying illegal conspiracy that the plaintiffs are 
challenging.235 
Even though a conspiracy to arbitrate cannot succeed without 
federal judges serving as collaborators, some courts fail to recognize 
that they are mere instrumentalities of an illegal cartel. As a result, 
they compel the victims of an arbitration conspiracy to arbitrate their 
conspiracy claims. For example, the Fifth Circuit has held that “[e]ven 
if the district court were to find that such an antitrust conspiracy [to 
impose arbitration clauses] existed, this finding would not compel the 
invalidation of the agreement to arbitrate . . . .”236 Similarly, a 
federal judge in Kansas held that the plaintiffs’ lawsuit alleging a 
conspiracy to arbitrate could not be heard in federal court, but rather 
had to be decided by an arbitrator.237 Both of these courts cited “the 
FAA’s strong policy toward enforcing arbitration clauses” to hold 
that “declaring the arbitration clauses unenforceable is not an 
appropriate remedy” in litigation alleging an illegal conspiracy to 
 
 235. The goal of a conspiracy to arbitrate is to funnel all claims against the defendants 
into private arbitration. Further, when the conspiracy to arbitrate is a secondary 
conspiracy, price-fixing firms are seeking to prevent their victims from bringing price-
fixing claims in federal court. 
 236. Dillard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1155 (5th 
Cir. 1992) (affirming district court order compelling arbitration). 
 237. In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., No. 02-MD-1468, 2003 WL 
21254765, at *6 (D. Kan. May 27, 2003) (“In sum, the court rejects plaintiffs’ argument 
that the arbitration clauses in this case are not enforceable because they are allegedly the 
product of an antitrust conspiracy.”). 
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arbitrate.238 This invocation of a supposed federal policy in favor of 
arbitration is flawed because Congress embedded no such policy in 
the FAA.239 
In theory, federal law precludes judicial “enforcement of the 
arbitration provision [if enforcement] would make the Court a party 
to the unlawful activity” such as an antitrust violation.240 But this rule 
is rendered meaningless when courts hold that an arbitrator gets to 
decide whether an arbitration clause violates antitrust law.241 If 
federal courts compel plaintiffs to arbitrate their conspiracy-to-
arbitrate claims, then the conspirators have already succeeded; the 
purpose of the conspiracy was to force their customers into 
arbitration.242 While it is true that plaintiffs could theoretically pursue 
their antitrust claims in arbitration, by deferring to arbitration clauses 
with class-action waivers, federal judges make it economically 
infeasible for the victims of arbitration conspiracies to bring 
individual claims.243 
Even if individual plaintiffs did pursue their claims in arbitration, 
the arbitration process is much more pro-defendant, which is one 
reason why antitrust defendants conspire to impose arbitration 
clauses in the first place. With limited discovery, antitrust plaintiffs 
are less likely to secure incriminating evidence.244 Moreover, arbiters 
may exhibit explicit or unconscious bias in favor of antitrust 
defendants, who are more likely to be repeat players and thus hire the 
 
 238. Id. at *4; see Dillard, 961 F.2d at 1154–55. 
 239. See supra note 18. 
 240. Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, 154 (D.D.C. 2004), cert. 
denied, 549 U.S. 1156 (2007) (“Under the FAA, however, a party is not relieved from an 
agreement to arbitrate on the ground that the contract is allegedly void for violation of the 
antitrust laws unless plaintiffs demonstrate that the Court’s enforcement of the arbitration 
provision would make the Court a party to the unlawful activity.”); see also Dickstein v. 
duPont, 443 F.2d 783, 786 (1st Cir. 1971) (“But antitrust defenses are allowed only in cases 
where the intrinsic illegality of the contract is so clear that enforcement would make a 
court party to the precise conduct forbidden by the law.”). 
 241. Jung, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 154 (deciding that on the issue of “whether a contract 
violates the antitrust laws, federal law permits the arbitrator to make that determination” 
(citing Simula, Inc. v. Autoliv, Inc., 175 F.3d 716, 721 (9th Cir. 1999); Coors Brewing Co. v. 
Molson Breweries, 51 F.3d 1511, 1516 (10th Cir. 1995))). 
 242. In some ways, this judicial error is reminiscent of the mistake that the Supreme 
Court made in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395 
(1967), in which the Court held that an arbitrator gets to decide whether the contract—
containing an arbitration clause—was itself procured by fraud. Id. at 399–400. Prima Paint 
is widely considered to be wrongly decided and reasoned. See, e.g., Moses, supra note 18, 
at 130. 
 243. See supra notes 33–45 and accompanying text. 
 244. See supra notes 51–55 and accompanying text. 
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arbitrator again.245 Furthermore, antitrust defendants may load their 
arbitration clauses with anti-consumer terms—such as limiting 
discovery, shortening statutes of limitations, banning injunctive relief, 
and eliminating pro-plaintiff fee shifting—that would be 
unenforceable in federal court but may be enforced by an 
arbitrator.246 All of these factors make it less likely that participants in 
an actual conspiracy to arbitrate will be held liable in arbitration. In 
sum, when federal judges send an arbitration conspiracy complaint to 
arbitration, the conspirators are securing the very aims of the 
conspiracy that federal judges are supposed to invalidate and punish. 
C. Judicial Misuse of Equitable Doctrines to Enforce Conspiracies to 
Arbitrate 
Courts sometimes employ equitable doctrines to compel 
arbitration in ways that benefit antitrust conspirators. When antitrust 
plaintiffs bring lawsuits alleging price-fixing conspiracies, some courts 
invoke equitable principles to require plaintiffs to arbitrate claims 
against even those defendants with whom the plaintiffs have no 
contractual relationship. For example, in In re Titanium Dioxide 
Antitrust Litigation,247 plaintiffs brought class-action litigation against 
four defendants—DuPont, Huntsman, Kronos, and Millennium—for 
conspiring to fix the price of titanium dioxide.248 The plaintiffs settled 
with DuPont and Huntsman, the largest players in the market.249 
Although neither Kronos nor Millennium were in contractual 
relationships with most of the class members, these defendants 
argued that those class members who had entered contracts with 
DuPont or Huntsman that contained arbitration clauses could not sue 
 
 245. Pat K. Chew, Comparing the Effects of Judges’ Gender and Arbitrators’ Gender in 
Sex Discrimination Cases and Why It Matters, 32 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 195, 210 
(2017) (“[E]mployers are repeat players who are likely to be more familiar with the 
arbitration process, including the selection of the arbitrators.”); Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. 
Fisch & A. C. Pritchard, Attorneys as Arbitrators, 39 J. LEGAL STUD. 109, 118 (2010) 
(discussing study that “concluded that party control of selection results in the brokerage 
firms, which are more likely to be repeat players, dominating the selection process and 
producing panels more likely to contain arbitrators who tend to side with large brokerage 
firms”); Lemley and Leslie, supra note 45, at 18–20 (describing how “repeat player bias 
may infect the arbitration process”); Note, Mandatory Arbitration Clauses: Proposals for 
Reform of Consumer-Defendant Arbitration, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1170, 1175 (2009) (“If a 
party that is a repeat player is allowed to reject arbitrators or otherwise influence the 
selection process, the arbitrator will have a strong incentive to find for the repeat player 
consistently.”). 
 246. See supra Section I.B.2. 
 247. 962 F. Supp. 2d 840 (D. Md. 2013). 
 248. Id. at 844–45. 
 249. Id. 
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Kronos and Millennium in court.250 Kronos and Millennium moved to 
compel arbitration.251 The district court granted the motion, holding 
that “the class members would be equitably estopped from avoiding 
the arbitration clauses that they signed with DuPont and 
Huntsman.”252 The court was unpersuaded by the plaintiffs’ argument 
that this equitable estoppel “doctrine cannot apply when the 
connection between [the antitrust defendants] is only their illegal 
concerted activity.”253 Not only did the court reject the plaintiffs’ 
claims, the court accused the plaintiffs of being unscrupulous, 
informing the plaintiffs that 
[t]hey cannot rely on their contracts to assert this Sherman Act 
claim, yet repudiate the clauses within those contracts that 
preclude certain members from participating in this class action 
litigation. To rule otherwise would in essence allow class 
members to have their cake and eat it too—in other words, to 
“rely on the contract when it works” to their advantage, while 
“repudiating it” when it works to their disadvantage.254 
The court misconstrued the plaintiffs’ case; the plaintiffs were in 
no way trying to enforce any contracts against the remaining 
defendants. The plaintiffs had no contractual relationship with 
Kronos and Millennium at all.255 The plaintiffs, however, did not need 
one because the plaintiffs had antitrust standing to recover from any 
member of the price-fixing conspiracy.256 
The court similarly applied “equitable reasons” to hold that the 
forum selection clauses, jury waivers, and class-action waivers 
 
 250. Id. at 849. 
 251. Id. at 848. 
 252. Id. at 850. 
 253. Id. 
 254. Id. at 852 (quoting In re Humana Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971, 976 
(11th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom., PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003)). 
To accuse the plaintiffs of “rely[ing] on the contract,” see id., is an odd characterization of 
the plaintiffs’ claims. They were neither suing for breach nor trying to enforce the 
contract; they were bringing a civil claim based on the defendants’ alleged criminal 
conduct of price fixing. 
 255. Id. at 849 (“[A]lmost all of the arbitration clauses that Defendants Millennium 
and Kronos seek to enforce derive from contracts formed between class members and 
either DuPont or Huntsman. Indeed, the record reflects that there are only seven Kronos 
contracts and seven Millennium contracts that contain arbitration clauses.”). 
 256. 1 NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS §	2:8, at 106 (Alba Conte & Herbert. B. 
Newberg eds., 4th ed. 2002) (“Where a conspiracy among several defendants is alleged, 
such as in antitrust price-fixing conspiracies, it is settled that one coconspirator is liable for 
all the damages inflicted by the conspiracy, and the plaintiff has standing to sue any or all 
of the coconspirators whether or not the plaintiff has had any direct business dealings or 
other relationship with a particular defendant.”). 
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contained in the plaintiffs’ contracts with the signatory defendants 
(who had settled) could also be enforced by the non-signatory 
defendants.257 This is outrageous: a buyer who pays an illegally 
inflated price for a product cannot sue the antitrust violator in court 
because of that violator’s illicit relationship with another conspirator. 
Such reasoning fails to appreciate that enforcing an arbitration 
agreement with respect to non-signatories perpetuates the illegal 
agreement. Despite this, the equitable estoppel for co-conspirators 
appears to be the majority approach.258 Subsequently, courts in other 
jurisdictions have followed the reasoning of Titanium Dioxide.259 
Although the Titanium Dioxide litigation did not involve 
allegations of a conspiracy to arbitrate, including such allegations 
does not restore the plaintiffs’ right to sue in court. For example, in In 
re Universal Service Fund Telephone Billing Practices Litigation,260 
plaintiffs alleged an antitrust conspiracy among long-distance carriers, 
including a conspiracy to impose arbitration clauses.261 The district 
judge concluded that “notions of equity and fairness require the court 
to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ antitrust claims against the long 
distance carriers other than their own under the terms of those 
plaintiffs’ arbitration clauses with their respective long distance 
carriers.”262 Like the Titanium Dioxide opinion, the court here 
asserted that because the plaintiffs had alleged “concerted 
misconduct” among the antitrust defendants, the defendants could 
take advantage of each other’s arbitration clauses.263 The Universal 
Service Fund opinion gave substantial weight to the fact that the 
plaintiffs had alleged a conspiracy to arbitrate, holding that equitable 
estoppel principles allowed non-signatory defendants to compel 
plaintiffs to arbitrate even though those defendants had no 
contractual relation to the plaintiffs solely because “the arbitration 
clauses at issue are a product of the alleged conspiratorial behavior 
. . . .”264 The court accused the plaintiffs of trying “to rely on the 
terms of their service contracts” to claim an antitrust conspiracy but 
not “to be bound by the arbitration clauses in their service contracts 
despite the fact that those service contracts are the basis for their 
 
 257. Titanium Dioxide, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 852. 
 258. Id. at 851 (citing cases supporting that approach). 
 259. See, e.g., Valspar Corp. v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 15 F. Supp. 3d 928, 
933–34 (D. Minn. 2014). 
 260. 300 F. Supp. 2d 1107 (D. Kan. 2003). 
 261. See id. at 1139. 
 262. Id. at 1140 (emphasis added). 
 263. See id. at 1139–40. 
 264. Id. at 1140 n.17. 
96 N.C. L. REV. 381 (2018) 
2017] CONSPIRACY TO ARBITRATE 431 
antitrust claims.”265 This characterization is inaccurate because the 
plaintiffs were not trying to enforce the contracts. Instead, they 
argued that the contracts provided evidence of an illegal conspiracy in 
a statutory claim against a firm with which the plaintiffs had no 
contract. 
These cases illustrate how federal courts have become enforcers 
of the alleged conspiracies that they are tasked with scrutinizing and, 
if proven, punishing. For example, if the defendants in Universal 
Service Fund did conspire to impose arbitration clauses as alleged, 
then the court enforced the conspiracy by forcing the plaintiffs to 
arbitrate their antitrust claims. The court implemented exactly what 
the underlying conspirators had sought all along: to prevent their 
customers from litigating their antitrust claims in court.266 Similarly, 
by enforcing both the arbitration clauses and the collateral anti-
consumer terms buried in those arbitration clauses, the Titanium 
Dioxide opinion assured businesses that federal courts will enforce 
multiple aspects of a secondary conspiracy to arbitrate. 
How do courts justify using equitable doctrines to reach such 
inequitable results? They invoke the Supreme Court’s manufactured 
federal policy that reveres arbitration.267 Whether or not the plaintiffs’ 
antitrust case involves allegations of a conspiracy to impose 
arbitration clauses, courts have used equitable estoppel to allow non-
signatory antitrust defendants to enforce their co-defendants’ 
arbitration clauses and have the plaintiffs’ antitrust claims removed 
from federal court. In both scenarios, courts have relied upon the 
pretended federal preference for arbitration. For example, the 
Titanium Dioxide court reasoned that the plaintiffs were compelled to 
arbitrate against the non-signatories because otherwise “the federal 
policy in favor of arbitration [would be] effectively thwarted.”268 
Similarly, the Universal Service Fund court worried that if it did not 
allow the non-signatories to “compel arbitration of all of the 
plaintiffs’ claims under the terms of the respective arbitration clauses, 
 
 265. Id. at 1140 (“Plaintiffs are essentially attempting to ‘have it both ways.’”). 
 266. The misuse of equitable estoppel against plaintiffs seeking to avoid arbitration is 
not unique to antitrust jurisprudence but rather resides in arbitration law more broadly, as 
courts treat conspiracy allegations as the hook that allows non-signatories to force the 
alleged conspiracy’s victims into arbitration. See, e.g., Aggarao v. MOL Ship Mgmt. Co., 
675 F.3d 355, 373 (4th Cir. 2012); Autonation Fin. Servs. Corp. v. Arain, 592 S.E.2d 96, 101 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (discussing In re Humana, Inc. Managed Care Litig., 285 F.3d 971 
(11th Cir. 2002), rev’d sub nom., PacifiCare Health Sys., Inc. v. Book, 538 U.S. 401 (2003)). 
 267. See supra notes 25–28 and accompanying text. 
 268. In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 962 F. Supp. 2d 840, 850 (D. Md. 2013) 
(quoting MS Dealer Serv. Corp v. Franklin, 177 F.3d 942, 947 (11th Cir. 1999)). 
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the arbitration proceedings between the signatories to the service 
contracts . . . will ‘be rendered meaningless and the federal policy in 
favor of arbitration effectively thwarted.’”269 As explained previously, 
the courts’ reasoning in these cases is troubling for three reasons. 
First, although courts claim that they would not compel arbitration in 
a manner that would effectuate antitrust conspiracies,270 the above 
decisions result in federal judges enforcing the very conspiracies to 
arbitrate that the plaintiffs are challenging.271 Second, there is nothing 
equitable about a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement being 
able to force the victim of an alleged conspiracy to arbitrate into 
arbitration.272 Third, these opinions are based on a false premise 
because Congress never enacted a federal policy in favor of 
arbitration.273 
In sum, courts apply equitable doctrines in a manner that creates 
inequitable results. In the context of antitrust conspiracies, judges 
should exercise their discretion to protect the victims of illegal 
conspiracies, not the perpetrators. 
 
 269. Universal Serv. Fund, 300 F. Supp. 2d at 1140 (quoting Sam Reisfeld & Son Imp. 
Co. v. S.A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 1976)). 
 270. Cf. Hammes v. AAMCO Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 783 (7th Cir. 1994) 
(stating that an arbitration clause may be enforceable in an antitrust case “[e]specially .	.	. 
where .	.	. there is no suggestion that the party resisting invocation of the clause was 
coerced into accepting it or that the arbitrators are themselves a cat’s paw of the cartel”); 
Dickstein v. duPont,	443 F.2d 783, 786 (1st Cir. 1971)	(allowing antitrust defenses to 
arbitration “only in cases where the intrinsic illegality of the contract is so clear that 
enforcement would make a court party to the precise conduct forbidden by the law”); 
Jung v. Ass’n of Am. Med. Colls., 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, 153–54 (D.D.C. 2004) (“Under the 
FAA .	.	. a party is not relieved from an agreement to arbitrate on the ground that the 
contract is allegedly void for violation of the antitrust laws unless plaintiffs demonstrate 
that the Court’s enforcement of the arbitration provision would make the Court a party to 
the unlawful activity.”). 
 271. In theory, an arbitrator could decide whether a particular arbitration is 
inappropriate because it is the product of an illegal conspiracy. Such an approach is 
nonsensical; the plaintiffs’ argument is that they should not be in arbitration at all. Such a 
misstep is similar to the Supreme Court’s flawed opinions holding that arbitrators, not 
courts, should determine the legality of contracts with arbitration clauses. See Buckeye 
Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 445–46 (2006). 
 272. See Frank Z. LaForge, Inequitable Estoppel: Arbitrating with Nonsignatory 
Defendants Under Grigson v. Creative Artists, 84 TEX. L. REV. 225, 241 (2005) (“[E]quity 
is not offended by the nonenforcement of an arbitration clause by a nonsignatory against a 
signatory.”). 
 273. See supra notes 17–18 and accompanying text. 
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D. Giving Retroactive Effect to Arbitration Clauses in Antitrust 
Disputes 
A secondary conspiracy to arbitrate may become particularly 
attractive if price-fixing firms suspect that their cartel has been, or is 
about to be, detected by its victims. Price-fixing firms that have not 
already burdened their customers with mandatory arbitration clauses 
may rationally fear being sued in federal court for violating section 1 
of the Sherman Act. But price-fixing conspirators can prevent 
themselves from being hauled into court by imposing retroactive 
arbitration clauses before their victims file suit. At the first sign of 
trouble, price fixers can amend their consumer contracts to force 
arbitration of antitrust violations that the firms have already 
committed.274 
Courts in antitrust cases have held that companies can impose 
arbitration clauses requiring that all claims—including those arising 
before the insertion of the arbitration clause into the consumer 
contract—must be arbitrated, so long as the arbitration clause is 
imposed before the commencement of the litigation.275 For example, 
the First Circuit has held that arbitration provisions imposed by 
antitrust defendants after an alleged antitrust violation should be 
applied retroactively to plaintiffs’ antitrust claims.276 Federal judges 
have held that the arbitration clause need not even state that it 
applies retroactively; as long as the clause has “broad wording,” 
courts allow antitrust defendants to employ the clause retroactively to 
compel arbitration and evade litigation.277 
Price-fixing firms can load these retroactive arbitration clauses 
with anti-consumer terms that effectively prevent even pre-existing 
victims from pursuing any remedy.278 For example, courts in antitrust 
 
 274. See In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., 230 F.R.D. 303, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004). 
 275. Id. Some courts have allowed arbitration clauses to apply retroactively even to 
claims that have already been filed. See, e.g., In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 962 
F. Supp. 2d 840, 854–55 (D. Md. 2013) (“For those contracts where the retroactive 
application is not specifically stated, the broad working of each clause and the underlying 
federal policy in favor of arbitration lead to the conclusion that these clauses apply 
retroactively.”). 
 276. Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 64 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 277. In re Titanium Dioxide, 962 F. Supp. 2d at 854–55 (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25; Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane 
Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991)); see also In re Lithium Ion Batters Antitrust Litig., No. 13-
MD-02420-YGR, 2016 WL 5791357, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2016) (“In particular, courts 
have found that the retroactive application of an arbitration agreement is not ‘wholly 
groundless’ where the arbitration provision is broad.”). 
 278. See supra Section I.B.2. 
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cases have held that retroactive arbitration clauses can include class-
action waivers and thus prevent consumers from participating in a 
class action based on conduct that occurred before the defendant 
inserted the class-action bar in its mandatory arbitration clause.279 
Such rulings are troubling because class-action waivers may 
effectively prevent consumers from seeking any relief for their 
injuries. Courts have also held that antitrust defendants can use 
backward-applying arbitration provisions to retroactively impose a 
forum selection clause.280 By selecting a particularly inconvenient 
forum, price-fixing firms can manipulate the forum selection 
provision to make it practicably infeasible for consumers to arbitrate 
at all.281 Arbiters may enforce such provisions even when judges 
would invalidate them.282 
Courts justify their embrace of retroactive arbitration clauses by 
again invoking the so-called congressional policy favoring arbitration. 
For example, when retroactively enforcing an arbitration clause in an 
antitrust case, one federal judge concluded that “the underlying 
federal policy in favor of arbitration lead[s] to the conclusion that 
these clauses apply retroactively.”283 The decision is typical.284 The 
courts’ reliance on a federal pro-arbitration policy is, again, troubling 
and mistaken because it is based on a false reading of the FAA. 
Congress never intended the FAA to apply to contracts of adhesion 
at all, let alone contracts of adhesion used to retroactively impose 
mandatory arbitration of statutory claims based on conduct that 
predated the arbitration provision.285 
 
 279. See In re Currency Conversion, 230 F.R.D. at 312 (“[A]rbitration clauses 
engrafted on cardholder agreements prior to this litigation are enforceable .	.	.	.”). 
 280. TradeComet.com LLC v. Google, Inc., 435 F. App’x 31, 34 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 281. Leslie, supra note 3, at 289–90. 
 282. See id. 
 283. In re Titanium Dioxide Antitrust Litig., 962 F. Supp. 2d 840, 854–55 (D. Md. 2013) 
(citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983); 
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 25 (1991)). 
 284. See Kristian v. Comcast Corp., 446 F.3d 25, 35 (1st Cir. 2006) (applying arbitration 
clause retroactively in decision that notes the “strong federal policy of resolving any 
doubts concerning arbitrability in favor of arbitration” (citing Moses H. Cone Mem’l 
Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25 (1983)); In re Currency Conversion, 230 
F.R.D. at 312; In re Universal Serv. Fund Tel. Billing Practices Litig., 300 F. Supp. 2d 1107, 
1124 (D. Kan. 2003) (claiming that “[t]he FAA specifically gives full force and effect to 
such retroactive arbitration provisions” (citing 9 U.S.C. §	2 and collecting cases)). 
 285. Leslie, supra note 3, at 290. 
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IV.  A CASE STUDY IN JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF CONSPIRACIES TO 
ARBITRATE 
The judicial embrace of a fictional congressional policy favoring 
arbitration distorts how courts evaluate antitrust claims of illegal 
conspiracies to arbitrate even when a court adjudicates the lawsuit 
instead of sending it to arbitration. This Part presents a case study of 
such distortion. In Ross v. American Express Co.,286 following a bench 
trial, the district court held for the defendants, who were accused of 
conspiring to impose mandatory arbitration clauses with class-action 
waivers on their customers.287 The court’s extensive opinion presents 
a litany of judicial errors, culminating in its failure to recognize that it 
did, in fact, find an illegal conspiracy to arbitrate. Ultimately 
influenced by the Supreme Court’s assertion that Congress had 
endorsed arbitration over litigation, the Ross court made it harder for 
plaintiffs to establish a conspiracy to arbitrate than to prove other 
antitrust conspiracies.288 
A. Factual Background 
The alleged conspiracy was set in motion in 1999 when two 
partners from a top-tier law firm approached in-house counsel for 
American Express “about Amex co-sponsoring an ‘informal meeting 
of senior in-house credit card counsel representing the various 
segments of the U.S. credit card business’ on ‘issues of common 
concern,’ including arbitration.”289 The outside lawyers organized a 
conference for credit card companies.290 The conference’s “invitation 
included a proposed agenda listing ‘the use of arbitration clauses in 
card agreements’ as a topic” and indicated, by name, that several 
major credit card companies were “likely attendees.”291 The first 
meeting was attended by executives or lawyers for Amex, Citi, and 
Discover, along with five card-issuing banks.292 At the time of this first 
meeting, in May 1999, only First USA and Amex included arbitration 
clauses in their customer contracts.293 First USA hired a consultant 
“to develop a ‘forum to talk about arbitration issues,’” and that 
 
 286. 35 F. Supp. 3d 407 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 630 F. App’x 79 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 287. Id. at 407, 415. 
 288. This case study is particularly important because this group “engineered” the 
national “move to block class actions” by inserting class-action waivers in mandatory 
arbitration clauses. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 97, at 22. 
 289. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 415. 
 290. Id. at 415–16. 
 291. Id. at 416. 
 292. Id. 
 293. Id. 
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consultant “furnished unsolicited updates to the Issuing Banks on 
competitors’ plans” regarding whether and when to adopt mandatory 
arbitration clauses.294 
This initial meeting led to the banks creating a group, which 
called itself “the Arbitration Coalition.”295 Amex and First USA were 
listed as co-chairs on invitations to the first meeting of the Arbitration 
Coalition.296 One invitation to a meeting of the Arbitration Coalition 
“expressed a need to do a better job in communicating with other 
lenders that have adopted arbitration programs.”297 For its July 1999 
meeting, which representatives from seven issuing banks attended, 
the meeting’s “Arbitration Agenda” included such items as “‘working 
together to turn the tide’ [and] contained the subheadings ‘sharing 
best practices’ and ‘drafting fair, enforceable arbitration provisions,’” 
as well as public relations issues.298 Ultimately, “[t]here were eighteen 
more meetings or conference calls of the self-styled ‘Arbitration 
Coalition.’”299 
The members of the Arbitration Coalition often requested and 
shared the content of their arbitration clauses and related documents 
with each other. For example, one bank’s consultant on arbitration 
issues emailed the issuing banks, requesting “if you have not already 
done so, please send me the arbitration clause used by your company, 
any change-in-terms notices that were involved in the adoption of the 
clause, and any answers to FAQs or other explanations of the 
clause.”300 The Coalition members circulated, revised, and 
coordinated their “FAQs and Talking Points” regarding arbitration 
clauses.301 The Coalition members asked each other for, and received, 
information about whether they allowed cardholders to opt out of an 
arbitration clause.302After one 2002 conference call, a representative 
 
 294. Id. at 447. 
 295. Id. at 416. 
 296. Id. at 417. 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. 
 299. Id. 
 300. Id. at 416, 418. 
 301. Id. at 420 (“Following the meeting, Daily circulated revisions to the FAQs and 
Talking Points to Arbitration Coalition members. The revisions reflected ‘comments 
received from the group at our last meeting, as well as comments [Daily] received 
internally [at Discover].’ Daily encouraged Arbitration Coalition members to ‘tailor these 
documents as you see fit’ and elaborated on how Discover customized its own version.”). 
 302. Id. at 426 (“On July 31, 2001, Barry (Capital One) reached out to Gail (Bank 
One) to ascertain whether Bank One permitted cardholders to opt-out of its arbitration 
provision, and ‘[i]f yes, was there a penalty (i.e. they had to close their accounts)? And, 
what percentage of people opted out?’”). 
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of MBNA emailed its competitors, who were members of a Coalition 
“working group,” to ask about how to deal with “cardholders 
attempting to amend their agreements unilaterally to add alternate 
arbitration fora.”303 Before some meetings, Coalition members were 
emailed and “encouraged . . . to ‘bring a copy of your arbitration 
agreement’” to the meeting.304 
Through the Arbitration Coalition, bank officials often shared 
with each other their non-public plans regarding implementing 
arbitration clauses. For example, Chase’s in-house counsel drafted an 
internal memo to memorialize the Coalition’s September 1999 
meeting, which “contained non-public information relating to three 
Issuing Banks’ future plans for arbitration.”305 Similarly in 2001, after 
one conference call, a representative of MBNA “emailed her 
colleagues that Chase has an arbitration clause under ‘active 
consideration.’ The information about Chase’s arbitration clause was 
not publicly available.”306 The members reported to each other when 
they “had implemented arbitration provisions through change-in-
terms notices sent to cardholders,” as well as when they were about to 
do so, even when that information “was not publicly known at that 
time.”307 
The members of the Arbitration Coalition often inquired into 
the internal decision-making of their rival banks with respect to 
arbitration clauses. For example, in January 2001, one lawyer, whose 
firm was involved in the Coalition, emailed a lawyer at Citi “on behalf 
of ‘a client considering using arbitration clauses in credit card 
agreements’ . . . to ‘confirm that Universal and Citibank (South 
Dakota) [were] not currently using arbitration’ . . . ‘[and to ask 
whether] the use of arbitration clauses is still under consideration and 
what the major concerns are.’”308 These facts suggest that some banks 
were reluctant to impose arbitration clauses unless all of their major 
competitors were doing so as well, and that they wanted some 
assurances that all of the members of the Coalition were imposing 
arbitration clauses on their customers. One bank’s consultant working 
with the Arbitration Coalition 
exhorted the group that “class actions are getting out of hand” 
and have become “a gaming business” and a “shakedown 
 
 303. Id. at 429. 
 304. Id. at 421, 443. 
 305. Id. at 419. 
 306. Id. at 428. 
 307. Id. at 423. 
 308. Id. 
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racket,” but that the group could “beat” the problem “by 
working together.” His prepared remarks suggested that the 
trial bar was more organized than large consumer companies 
because “[a]s competitors we are conditioned to go it alone” 
due to a “Century + of [the] Sherman [Act].”309 
In noting the need to work together, the consultant specifically noted 
the “fear of competitor exploitation . . . .”310 This sounds like the 
classic cartel conundrum: no firm wants to raise price without 
assurances that its rivals will also raise price because the first-moving 
firm does not want its competitors to exploit the price asymmetry to 
steal customers. 
Taken together, the facts surrounding the creation and meetings 
of the Arbitration Coalition and its subgroup, the In–House Working 
Group, show a pattern of meetings among competitors before every 
bank ultimately adopted arbitration clauses with class-action waivers. 
The structure of the market lent itself to illegal cartelization. The 
court noted that the general-purpose credit card market had “high 
barriers to entry” and that the issuing banks collectively had 
approximately eighty-seven percent market share.311 The district court 
summarized the timeline as follows: 
Together, the Issuing Banks participated in 28 meetings over a 
four-year period exploring avenues to displace class actions 
with arbitration of cardholder disputes. During that same 
approximate period, each Issuing Bank adopted a class-action-
barring arbitration clause. While First USA implemented its 
class-action-barring arbitration clause more than a year before 
the first meeting, all of the other Issuing Banks noticed and 
implemented clauses within a month of an Arbitration 
Coalition or In–House Working Group meeting attended by 
their counsel. In May 2002, Chase was the last Issuing Bank to 
adopt such a clause. One month later, the multi-year pattern of 
meeting nearly bimonthly dropped off. Indeed, the Arbitration 
Coalition did not meet again for almost a year, and after two 
follow-up conference calls, appeared to have disbanded.312 
The court failed to appreciate how suspicious it was that the 
group disbanded once every bank adopted mandatory arbitration. 
After all, if the goal of the group was to defend arbitration clauses 
and to do public relations work, the group would have needed to 
 
 309. Id. at 424. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. at 430. 
 312. Id. at 439. 
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continue after every bank imposed an arbitration clause. In contrast, 
if the group’s goal was to get every firm to adopt an arbitration clause 
with a class-action waiver, then the group could stop meeting after it 
attained that goal. 
After reviewing the evidence, the court found no agreement 
among the members of the Arbitration Coalition to insert arbitration 
clauses (with class-action waivers) in their contracts with customers.313 
The court concluded 
[w]hen the first meeting convened, only two defendants had 
class-action-barring arbitration clauses in their card member 
agreements. By the time the last meeting concluded, all ten of 
the Issuing Banks, accounting for approximately 87% of all 
credit card transactions in the United States, had adopted class-
action-barring arbitration clauses in their card member 
agreements. It was only by a slender reed that Plaintiffs failed 
to demonstrate that the lawyers who organized these meetings 
had spawned a Sherman Act conspiracy among their clients.314 
The court did not apply the per se rule, but held that “under the 
‘quick look’ analysis on the record presented in this case, the collusive 
adoption of mandatory class-action-barring arbitration clauses, if 
proven, would have constituted an unreasonable restraint on trade in 
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.”315 But the court protected 
conspiracies to arbitrate by making it excessively difficult to prove an 
 
 313. Id. at 456–57. 
 314. Id. at 456. 
 315. Id. (emphasis added). “Quick look” is 
an “intermediate standard” and “applies in cases where per se condemnation is 
inappropriate but where no elaborate industry analysis is required to demonstrate 
the anticompetitive character of an inherently suspect restraint.” In such cases, “an 
observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude that 
the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers 
and markets.” In other words, “quick-look analysis carries the day when the great 
likelihood of anticompetitive effects can easily be ascertained.” Under “quick 
look” analysis, the competitive harm is presumed, and the “defendant must 
promulgate ‘some competitive justification’ for the restraint.” “If no legitimate 
justifications are set forth, the presumption of adverse competitive impact prevails 
and ‘the court condemns the practice without ado.’” “If the defendant offers sound 
pro-competitive justifications, however, the court must proceed to weigh the 
overall reasonableness of the restraint using a full-scale rule of reason analysis.” 
Deutscher Tennis Bund v. ATP Tour, Inc., 610 F.3d 820, 830–31 (3d Cir. 2010) (internal 
citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Brown, 5 F.3d 658, 669 (3d Cir. 1993) and 
California Dental Ass’n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)). 
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agreement. The Second Circuit affirmed,316 which is troubling because 
the district court made several errors, as Section IV.B argues. 
B. Judicial Mistakes 
The district court in Ross stated the law accurately, but it erred 
when applying it. The district court correctly noted that plaintiffs 
need not show a “formal agreement” in order to satisfy the agreement 
element of a section 1 claim.317 Instead, “[t]he essential combination 
or conspiracy in violation of the Sherman Act may be found in a 
course of dealings or other circumstances as well as in any exchange 
of words.”318 The agreement element is satisfied if “concert of action 
is contemplated and . . . the defendants conformed to the 
arrangement.”319 In addition to stating the law correctly, the court 
also observed the reality that antitrust “conspiracies ‘nearly always 
must be proven through inferences that may fairly be drawn from the 
behavior of the alleged conspirators.’”320 
The court’s application of the law, however, reveals several 
errors. First, by failing to understand how antitrust cartels operate, 
the Ross court misread the significance of much evidence in the case. 
Most notably, the court seemed to think that anything that made the 
Arbitration Coalition “resemble[] a trade association”—such as 
inviting outsiders to some meetings—“cuts against any inference that 
an express agreement to implement and maintain arbitration clauses 
was articulated at the Arbitration Coalition meetings.”321 The judge 
announced that he was “especially hesitant to infer an illicit 
agreement from a record in which many of the Issuing Banks’ 
communications resembled those of trade associations or lobbying 
groups.”322 This deference to activity resembling trade associations is 
misplaced given that, for the past century, trade associations have 
played a critical role in managing and stabilizing cartel operations.323 
 
 316. Ross v. Citigroup, Inc., 630 F. App’x 79, 80 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 317. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 437 (“No formal agreement is required to constitute an 
antitrust conspiracy.”). 
 318. Id. (quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States,	328 U.S. 781, 809–10 (1946)). 
 319. Id. (quoting United States v. Paramount Pictures,	334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948)). 
 320. Id. (quoting Anderson News, L.L.C. v. Am. Media, Inc., 680 F.3d 162, 183 (2d Cir. 
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 321. Id. at 445. The court also acknowledged that “[t]his, however, does not preclude a 
tacit meeting of the minds, or a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’ among the Issuing Banks,” but it 
still thought that the evidence of conspiracy was “ambiguous.” Id. 
 322. Id. at 452. 
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Many trade associations were created specifically to disguise price-
fixing arrangements.324 Trade associations are the perfect cover for 
cartels: their meetings explain travel records that would otherwise be 
evidence of cartel activity;325 they may facilitate cartel auditing;326 and 
they make it harder even for firms’ own internal antitrust compliance 
programs to spot price fixing.327 
Second, the Ross court seemed to use evidence of legal activity to 
offset evidence of illegal activity. For example, the court noted that 
the Arbitration Coalition’s lobbying activity would be protected by 
the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.328 But those activities were not being 
challenged; they were an irrelevant distraction. Most significantly, the 
court attached legal significance to its impression that most of the 
information exchanged at the Arbitration Coalition meetings was 
publicly available. For example, “[w]hile there is evidence that certain 
of the Issuing Banks shared some internal, non-public information, 
the bulk of the discussion centered on publicly available 
information—including the arbitration clauses themselves.”329 The 
fact that some permissible topics were discussed does not insulate the 
discussion and agreements on impermissible topics from antitrust 
liability. It neither explains nor justifies the potentially illegal 
activities. 
Third, the Ross court misunderstood and misapplied the antitrust 
doctrines for inferring an agreement. The court began by correctly 
noting that antitrust plaintiffs need not have direct evidence of an 
agreement. Plaintiffs can prove an agreement through circumstantial 
evidence, which requires “conscious parallelism” and “plus factors.” 
Conscious parallelism refers to defendants consciously engaging in 
parallel conduct, but this alone does not establish an agreement 
 
likely to die a natural death.”); Margaret C. Levenstein & Valerie Y. Suslow, What 
Determines Cartel Success?, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 43, 60–61 (2006) (citing literature showing 
between one-third and over one-half of studied cartels “were organized and maintained by 
trade associations”). 
 324. Leslie, supra note 233, at 660. 
 325. CONNOR, supra note 168, at 32 (“The major problem with face-to-face meetings, 
especially for global conspiracies, is that they create a paper trail of travel records. To 
overcome this problem, cartels often hold meetings concurrent with those of an otherwise 
legitimate trade association.”). 
 326. See id. at 30 (“[For cartels] [t]he cooperation of an accounting firm is more likely 
if the client is a trade association.”); Levenstein & Suslow, Breaking Up, supra note 323, at 
459 (“Many cartels exchange output, sales, and price data with each other or forward data 
to a third party, such as a trade association or an independent auditor.”). 
 327. CONNOR, supra note 168, at 462. 
 328. Ross v. Am. Express Co., 35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 452 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
 329. Id. at 445. 
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because firms may be engaging in similar conduct without actually 
agreeing with each other.330 To show that the parallel conduct is the 
product of an agreement, the plaintiff must also show the presence of 
so-called “plus factors,” such as motive and opportunity to conspire, 
communications among the defendants, radical and simultaneous 
changes in business practices, and evidence that each individual firm’s 
action would not have made sense in the absence of an agreement.331 
The Ross court erred when performing this analysis. 
At the outset, the court treated actual meetings of rivals in which 
they were encouraged to adopt arbitration clauses—and later did so—
as mere conscious parallelism.332 That is incorrect. Conscious 
parallelism would be merely that the rivals did the same thing (for 
example, adopt arbitration clauses). The members of the Arbitration 
Coalition exhibited much more than conscious parallelism because 
the competing banks were actually meeting about arbitration clauses 
and discussing how to make them the industry standard before ever 
adopting them.333 
Furthermore, the court mishandled the individual plus factors. 
For example, although motive to conspire is a traditional plus 
factor,334 the Ross court tried to distinguish between the banks’ 
“amply demonstrate[d]” motivation to “‘work together to turn the 
tide’ in order to make arbitration an ‘acceptable forum for resolving 
consumer debates’” and a motive “to collusively adopt the clauses.”335 
These are not as distinct as the court found. The court itself 
acknowledged that the banks were motivated to conspire to impose 
industry-wide arbitration clauses because they feared that mandatory 
 
 330. See Burtch v. Milberg Factors, Inc., 662 F.3d 212, 227 (3d Cir. 2011) (“Parallel 
conduct in itself is insufficient to state a plausible claim because it is ‘consistent with 
conspiracy, but just as much in line with a wide swath of rational and competitive business 
strategy unilaterally prompted by common perceptions of the market.’” (quoting Bell Atl. 
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 554 (2007))). 
 331. William E. Kovacic, Robert C. Marshall, Leslie M. Marx & Halbert L. White, Plus 
Factors and Agreement in Antitrust Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 393, 405–06, 415 (2011). 
 332. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 441. 
 333. The only two Issuing Banks with arbitration clauses, Amex and First USA, were 
the banks that “were actively involved in planning the initial meeting of the Arbitration 
Coalition on July 28, 1999.” Id. at 440. Why would Amex try to convince its rival banks to 
adopt arbitration clauses with class-action waivers if Amex was already protected by such 
clauses in its own contracts? Because the banks with arbitration clauses needed their rivals 
to include similarly anti-consumer arbitration clauses before arbitration clauses became 
salient to consumers. See id. at 442 (“Even if most consumers were indifferent, this does 
not foreclose a motive to keep arbitration non-salient while issuers quietly adopted it 
across the board.”). 
 334. United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 315 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 335. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 442 (quoting the defendants’ documentation). 
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arbitration was salient.336 Consequently, consumers could start 
shifting their business away from banks that required arbitration. If, 
however, all banks imposed mandatory arbitration, consumers could 
not avoid arbitration clauses, and banks would not fear losing 
business to banks that did not impose such clauses. Furthermore, the 
court explicitly recognized that industry-wide arbitration, and an 
agreement not to compete on arbitration clauses, could help “keep 
arbitration non-salient while issuers quietly adopted it across the 
board.”337 Asserting that the banks could have been “motivated to 
cooperate on efforts to sway public opinion and defend the legality of 
their clauses in the courts and legislatures,”338 the court (without 
citation) announced a new legal rule that “[w]hen the motive to 
cooperate is just as consistent with legitimate goals as non-legitimate 
goals, there can be no fair inference of collusion.”339 The court 
ultimately failed to recognize the anticompetitive reasons why rival 
firms would conspire to impose arbitration clauses on their 
customers.340 
Similarly, the court also mistreated the issue of product 
standardization as a plus factor. When firms artificially standardize 
their products, it counts as a plus factor, in part because this 
harmonization facilitates anticompetitive agreements, such as price 
fixing.341 While this inquiry generally occurs in the context of physical 
products, it also applies to the standardization of contract terms.342 In 
response to the plaintiffs’ argument that “the Issuing Banks’ 
arbitration clauses were artificially standardized as a result of their 
illegal agreement to include class action waivers and to otherwise bar 
 
 336. Id. at 442 (“The Issuing Banks harbored concerns ‘that using arbitration for credit 
cards could be perceived as anti-consumer.’”). 
 337. Id. at 442–43 (“While arbitration was not salient to most consumers at the time of 
the alleged conspiracy, collusion would ensure that no Issuing Bank facilitated a rise to 
salience before arbitration was firmly entrenched as the industry norm.”). 
 338. Id. at 443. 
 339. Id. The court’s reasoning is flawed. The firms had a motive to enter an illegal 
agreement; the court finds so. The fact that they had a motive to cooperate in legal 
ventures as well does not negate the motive to conspire. 
 340. See supra Section II.B.1 (describing firms’ potential benefits and incentives from 
entering conspiracies to arbitrate).  
 341. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F.2d 489, 493 (9th Cir. 1952) 
(“[S]tandardization of a product that is not naturally standardized facilitates the 
maintenance of price uniformity.”); In re Med. X-Ray Film Antitrust Litig., 946 F. Supp. 
209, 218 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (“[P]lus factors include .	.	. the artificial standardization of 
products .	.	.	.”); see also De Jong Packing Co. v. United States, 618 F.2d 1329, 1334 (9th 
Cir. 1980) (finding similar wording in letters as evidence of conspiracy). 
 342. In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litig., Nos. M 21–95, 05 Civ. 
7116(WHP), 2012 WL 401113, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 8, 2012). 
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collective redress,” the court found the evidence too “ambiguous.”343 
The court reasoned that although “the Issuing Banks were asked to 
provide copies of their arbitration clauses for analysis and discussion 
at meetings and they intended to work together to share ‘best 
practices,’” and that “the Arbitration Coalition had a special interest 
in defeating class action lawsuits,” arbitration clauses were becoming 
“au courant.”344 Thus, “it [was] unsurprising that over time each of the 
Issuing Banks’ arbitration clauses would morph to incorporate a class 
action waiver.”345 But arbitration clauses did not “morph” naturally; if 
it were going to happen naturally, then the Arbitration Coalition 
would not have felt the need to coordinate their efforts. 
The Ross court likewise mishandled the defendants’ inability to 
explain their suspicious parallel conduct. The judge noted that 
“[c]ontemporaneous notes survive from only 7 of the 28 meetings.”346 
While noting that it was “odd” that so little documentation exists for 
meetings involving considerable “investment of attorney time and 
travel expense in attending a series of meetings over a period of 
years,” the court deemed the scarcity of documentation “not 
alarming” because “formal minutes” are not “taken at a CLE or 
client development pitch.”347 But the court had earlier noted that 
these meetings did not resemble either CLE programs or client 
development meetings.348 Moreover, the fact that the defendants had 
no explanation for what happened at many of the meetings, with 
many attendees claiming not to remember attending,349 is itself an 
important plus factor for inferring an agreement.350 Thus, the court 
 
 343. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 448. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. The court failed to appreciate that “[o]ne way in which boilerplate could 
possibly become uniform in an industry or trade is by old-fashioned collusion, the kind 
that antitrust law is designed to target.” MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE 
FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND THE RULE OF LAW 41 (2013). 
 346. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 450 (“Other than three internal memos from the 
September 29, 1999 meeting, attendees generated little work product to inform their 
colleagues of what they learned at the meetings. And there is hardly any documentation 
regarding substance or even attendance for the In–House Working Group meetings.”). 
 347. Id. at 451. 
 348. Id. at 444–45. 
 349. Id. at 451 (“Many meeting attendees remembered very little about the substance 
of the meetings. At his February 2004 deposition, Heine, a ‘core’ member of the 
Arbitration Coalition recalled that there ‘may have been less than five meetings’ though 
he attended at least eleven meetings over the course of three years. Tasheff (Citi) did not 
remember attending the May 30, 2001 Class Action Working Group meeting even though 
she volunteered to lead the group’s efforts on ‘PR and Legislative Affairs’ with 
MacDermott (Amex) and Barry (Capital One).”). 
 350. See Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939) (“The failure 
under the circumstances to call as witnesses those officers .	.	. [to explain] whether they 
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improperly discounted the significance of these “memory gaps.”351 
The lack of notes and the claims of innocence are rendered more 
suspicious by the fact that the Coalition members’ denials of collusion 
sometimes appear feigned and not credible. For example, regarding a 
July 2001 conference call among the coalition members, “the call 
participants deny that arbitration was discussed. No attendance lists, 
notes, or memos of this call exist.”352 The court noted, however, that 
“[g]uilelessly, the designated passcode for the conference call was 
‘ARBITRATION.’”353 Such lack of explanation constitutes a plus 
factor for inferring agreements in antitrust law.354 
In addition to these discernable mistakes with respect to 
individual plus factors, the Ross court made an overarching error by 
disaggregating the evidence of conspiracy. Although the judge in Ross 
correctly noted that “courts examine the existence of a conspiracy ‘as 
a whole’ taking into consideration the totality of the evidence, as 
opposed to ‘dismembering it and viewing its separate parts,’”355 the 
judge did not follow the stated rule. The judge dismembered the 
evidence of conspiracy and looked at it in isolation, finding each 
individual piece of evidence to be insufficient in and of itself to prove 
that the banks conspired. The court repeatedly isolated evidence in 
order to diminish its legal significance. For example, after 
characterizing “many of the Issuing Banks’ communications [as] 
resembl[ing] those of trade associations or lobbying groups,” the 
court diminished the communications among competitors as 
insignificant because “[m]embership and participation in a trade 
association alone does not give rise to a plausible inference of illegal 
agreement.”356 The plaintiffs, of course, were not relying on this 
alone. 
 
had acted in pursuance of agreement is itself persuasive that their testimony, if given, 
would have been unfavorable to appellants.”); Kovacic et al., supra note 331, at 406 
(noting that “[t]he absence of a plausible, legitimate business rationale for suspicious 
conduct (such as certain communications with rivals) or the presentation of contrived 
rationales for certain conduct” as a plus factor); see also infra note 375 and accompanying 
text. 
 351. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 452 (“The memory gaps of a few witnesses do not 
transmogrify an honest lack of recollection into a conspiracy.”). 
 352. Id. at 426. 
 353. Id. 
 354. See infra note 375 and accompanying text. 
 355. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 438 (quoting Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon 
Corp.,	370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962)). 
 356. Id. at 452 (emphasis added) (quoting LaFlamme v. Societe Air France,	702 F. 
Supp. 2d 136, 148 (E.D.N.Y. 2010)). 
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Similarly, after the court acknowledged that “[t]here is no 
question that the Issuing Banks engaged in an unusually high amount 
of inter-firm communications regarding arbitration,”357 it then 
asserted that “a mere showing of close relations or frequent meetings 
between the alleged conspirators” cannot prove the existence of a 
conspiracy.358 The plaintiffs in Ross, however, had significantly more 
evidence than “a mere showing” of frequent meetings. The plaintiffs 
proved that the purpose of these meetings was to make mandatory 
arbitration the industry standard. The court mischaracterized the 
plaintiffs’ argument as inferring a conspiracy solely from 
“opportunities to conspire,” which, according to the court, “would 
condemn independent professional associations.”359 The plaintiffs, 
though, were not focusing on the banks’ mere opportunity to 
conspire; rather, the plaintiffs proved that these meetings among 
competitors were specifically called to encourage agreement on 
industry-wide arbitration.360 The Ross court’s approach violated the 
fundamental rule of antitrust law—that judges should not 
compartmentalize evidence of agreement.361 
Finally, and most importantly, the Ross court failed to recognize 
that it had, in fact, found an agreement among the defendants to 
impose arbitration clauses with class-action waivers. When evaluating 
all of the evidence, the court concluded 
[i]t is clear that the Issuing Banks had an agreement to explore 
collective advocacy efforts aimed at expanding the 
 
 357. Id. at 443. 
 358. Id. at 444 (emphasis added) (quoting H.L. Moore Drug Exch. v. Eli Lilly & 
Co.,	662 F.2d 935, 941 (2d Cir. 1981)). 
 359. Id. at 444 (citing Kreuzer v. Am. Acad. of Periodontology,	735 F.2d 1479, 1488–89 
(D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 360. The defendants tried to spin the meetings as client development opportunities 
initiated by a major law firm. Id. But the Ross court acknowledged that “[t]he number of 
meetings over a sustained period devoted to the topic of arbitration far exceeds a level 
normally associated with client development pitches or CLEs.” Id. Furthermore, if this 
was true client development, why have all of the rivals in the same room at the same time 
discussing how to impose the same anti-consumer terms in their contracts? 
  Moreover, at points the attorney leaders of the Arbitration Coalition sought 
information from the banks that was inconsistent with either client development or CLE. 
See id. at 444–45 (“The generation of joint work product, such as the FAQs project, is 
inconsistent with client development efforts because law firms do not generally parcel 
work assignments out to clients. And potential client invitees are not usually called on to 
educate one another or share internal analysis. Indeed, the significant level of cooperation 
among attendees was atypical of a CLE or client development pitch. Any lawyer would 
agree that CLEs and client development pitches do not typically involve homework 
assignments, the formation of sub-groups, or the development of a public relations 
campaign.”). 
 361. See Cont’l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp.,	370 U.S. 690, 699 (1962). 
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enforceability of arbitration clauses and to establish class-
action-barring arbitration as an industry norm. Direct evidence 
of this agreement abounds in meeting agendas, solicitations to 
fund amicus briefs and research, and willingness to explore joint 
action such as the FAQs project or self-regulation efforts.362 
Thus, the court held that the defendants “had an agreement . . . to 
establish class-action-barring arbitration as an industry norm.”363 That 
agreement is a conspiracy to arbitrate. To agree to have arbitration 
clauses with class-action waivers as the industry norm is to agree that 
every firm in the industry will impose such arbitration clauses, as they 
all did following the meetings of the Arbitration Coalition.364 This 
agreement among competitors to have industry-wide arbitration 
clauses is illegal.365 
The court’s description of the defendants’ actions and motives 
also demonstrates another mishandling of plus-factor analysis and 
another example of how the court did, in fact, find an illegal 
 
 362. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 452. 
 363. Id. 
 364. The district judge criticized the plaintiffs for reading evidence of an agreement “to 
establish class-action-barring arbitration as an industry norm .	.	. as evidence of a separate, 
illegal agreement to collusively adopt and maintain class-action-barring arbitration 
clauses.” Id. But, in the context of the Arbitration Coalition, these are equivalent. 
  In a way, the Ross court seemed to distinguish between an industry effort to 
standardize contract terms and an agreement among rivals to impose those standardized 
terms on their customers. This distinction is not persuasive. As Professor Mark Patterson 
has noted in the context of standardized contracts more generally, “it would make little 
sense for the parties to engage in a standardization effort were their uniform use of the 
contract not an assumption underlying that effort.” Patterson, supra note 129, at 394; see 
also id. at 395 (“[The] benefits of standardization arise from the widespread use of the 
standardized contract. Therefore, the effort makes sense if the contracts are to be 
adopted—as final contracts or as defaults from which negotiation begins—uniformly, but 
does not make sense in the absence of an understanding that they will all adopt the 
contract.”). Patterson explains that because standardization efforts are costly, the 
participants must expect a return on their investment of time and money. Id. at 406. He 
explains: “One possibility—the anticompetitive one—is that the standardization will 
constitute or facilitate collusion. To avoid an inference of that possibility, it seems that the 
standard-setters should be able to offer an alternative explanation of how their costs will 
be recovered.” Id. 
  Moreover, in its application, the court seemed to downplay the fact that “[a]fter 
the Arbitration Coalition ceased meetings, all the Issuing Banks had similar clauses.” 
Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 448. Yet, that is strong evidence of agreement. See infra note 378 
and accompanying text.  
 365. See supra Section II.A (discussing Paramount Famous Lasky). Moreover, because 
the court found that “[d]irect evidence of this agreement abounds,” Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 
452 (emphasis added), the court did not even need to consider the circumstantial evidence 
of conscious parallelism and plus factors, an analysis that the court ultimately performed 
incorrectly. See supra notes 334–54 and accompanying text. Circumstantial evidence is 
unnecessary when there is direct evidence of an illegal agreement. 
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agreement but failed to realize it. Traditionally, helping one’s 
competitors perfect their contracts would be considered against a 
business’s self-interest and would count as a plus factor.366 The Ross 
court conceded that the Arbitration Coalition “meetings evidenced a 
degree of communication and collaboration beyond what one would 
expect from a CLE or a trade association,” but it concluded that the 
meetings were not against self-interest of the banks that already had 
arbitration clauses; instead, it asserted that those banks needed to 
“educat[e] their competitors on how to ‘get it right’” in order to attain 
the “goal of establishing arbitration as an industry norm.”367 In other 
words, the court reasoned that the information-sharing meetings were 
not against the banks’ self-interest because they facilitated the goal of 
industry-wide arbitration. That is the cartel agreement: an agreement 
that every bank in the industry impose mandatory arbitration on its 
customers.368 
C. Inappropriate Deference to Arbitration 
The Ross opinion raises many important questions. How can a 
court find an illegal conspiracy and not realize it? Why did the Ross 
court mishandle plus-factor analysis? Why did it hold that 
conspiracies to arbitrate are not per se illegal? In short, why did the 
Ross court make so many mistakes? All of the questions share the 
same answer: an unhealthy deference to arbitration. 
The Ross court’s deference to arbitration clauses began with its 
decision not to apply antitrust law’s per se rule. Despite the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Paramount Famous Lasky, which condemned 
conspiracies to arbitrate as per se illegal,369 the Ross court cited the 
so-called federal policy favoring arbitration—as well as the Supreme 
Court’s pro-arbitration decisions in Concepcion and Italian Colors, 
among others—to hold that conspiracies to arbitrate are not per se 
illegal.370 Remarkably, the Ross court never mentioned Paramount 
 
 366. See In re Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., 801 F.3d 383, 399 (3d Cir. 
2015) (“[E]vidence of actions against self-interest means there is evidence of behavior that 
is inconsistent with a competitive market.”). 
 367. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 448. 
 368. Similarly, every member of a traditional price-fixing cartel will share information 
with its competitors in order to facilitate the cartel’s goal of raising market price. That 
does not make the information sharing in an individual firm’s self-interest as that phrase is 
used in antitrust law. Rather, the individual firm benefits because the act strengthens the 
cartel. 
 369. See supra Section II.A. 
 370. Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 454–55. The Ross court held that the per se rule does not 
apply to conspiracies to arbitrate because “the Supreme Court has expanded the reach of 
consumer arbitration clauses in the past thirty years.” Id. That is not a reason to not apply 
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Famous Lasky.371 Thus, the alleged congressional preference for 
arbitration seems to have affected substantive antitrust law. 
A similar pro-arbitration bend seems to have skewed the court’s 
interpretation of the facts. If judges regarded arbitration conspiracies 
as they do other antitrust conspiracies, they would undoubtedly find 
an agreement among competitors on analogous facts. Take the facts 
of Ross and replace “arbitration” with “raising prices,” and the 
presence of an agreement becomes clear: 
 a group of competitors created a group called the “Pricing 
Coalition”; 
 the stated goal of competitors’ coalition was to make higher 
prices the industry norm; 
 the group of competitors met 28 times; 
 the competitors shared non-public information about future 
pricing plans; 
 the competitors have no notes or memories of most of their 
meetings, though for one of these note-less meetings—at which 
the competitors claim raising price was not discussed—the 
passcode for the conference call was “Raising Prices”; 
 every firm in the coalition did, in fact, raise prices to the level 
articulated as the preferred “industry norm”; and 
 after every firm in the coalition has raised prices to the 
“industry norm,” the group disbands. 
In price-fixing jurisprudence, such a fact pattern clearly 
demonstrates an agreement under antitrust law. The formation of a 
group with the goal of raising prices,372 the holding of meetings among 
competitors,373 the sharing of non-public information about future 
 
the per se rule; that is the reason why conspiracies to arbitrate are more valuable. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court’s embrace of unilaterally imposed arbitration clauses is 
irrelevant to the legality of conspiracies to arbitrate. After all, antitrust law recognizes a 
firm’s right to raise price unilaterally, but still condemns conspiracies to raise price as per 
se illegal. 
 371. Instead, the Ross court relied on Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348 (2d Cir. 1978). 
Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 454. Drayer incorrectly suggested that Paramount Famous Lasky 
was not a per se case. See Drayer, 572 F.2d at 355; supra notes 98–118 (explaining why 
Paramount Famous Lasky is a per se case). More importantly, the court in Drayer relied 
on the inaccurate notion that “policy favors arbitration” and relied heavily on the fact that 
the unique regulations of the securities industry at issue. See Drayer, 572 F.2d at 353, 357–
58. Thus, Drayer was both incorrect and distinguishable. 
 372. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 221 (1940). 
 373. See In re Catfish Antitrust Litig., 826 F. Supp. 1019, 1039 (N.D. Miss. 1993) (“If 
proven, evidence of any meetings[,] .	.	. telephone conversations, or other electronic 
communications in pursuit and furtherance of the alleged conspiracy would be the most 
relevant evidence that could be introduced in proving the allegations of plaintiffs’ 
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pricing plans,374 the lack of an explanation for many meetings,375 the 
success in raising price,376 and the pretextual justifications for their 
meetings377 would be sufficient to prove an agreement in the context 
of price-fixing conspiracies. The fact that uniform action occurred 
after these meetings provides additional evidence of an agreement.378 
The important point here is not that price fixing is per se illegal; it is 
that these facts are sufficient to show an agreement for antitrust 
purposes. If such facts show an agreement for a price-fixing 
conspiracy, they should show an agreement for a conspiracy to 
arbitrate.379 
 
complaint of price fixing.”). In price-fixing cases, courts hold evidence of defendants’ 
meetings to be significant because meetings allow factfinders to infer that the prices were 
discussed. See Weit v. Cont’l Ill. Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. of Chi., 641 F.2d 457, 478 (7th Cir. 
1981). But the facts of Ross are even more damning because we know that the defendants 
discussed making mandatory arbitration the industry-wide standard. 
 374. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 211 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]xchanges of future 
price information are considered especially anticompetitive.”). 
 375. Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 225–26 (1939); VI PHILLIP 
E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW ¶1417c, at 109 (2d ed. 2003) 
(“Because contacts among competitors present a definite danger to competition, it is 
reasonable as a policy matter to require the companies that are meeting to explain their 
actions. When an innocent explanation is not forthcoming or is not plausible, the suspicion 
arises that the contact was made in furtherance of a conspiracy to suppress competition.”); 
see also Merck-Medco Managed Care, LLC v. Rite Aid Corp., No. 98-2847, 1999 WL 
691840, at *14 (4th Cir. Sept. 7, 1999) (per curiam) (finding forgotten conversations about 
important subjects as strong evidence of an illegal agreement to restrain trade). 
 376. United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 328 (2d Cir. 2015) (affirming the 
holding of an illegal price-fixing agreement because “motives, coupled with the 
unambiguous increase in the prices, .	.	. was sufficient to confirm that price fixing was the 
goal, and the result, of the conspiracy”). 
 377. In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 504 F. Supp. 2d 38, 53 (E.D. Pa. 2007). The 
Arbitration Coalition’s disbandment after the banks implemented uniform arbitration 
clauses shows that the group’s assertion of public relations and joint legal defense 
cooperation were pretextual. 
 378. See Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 241 (1996) (“Antitrust law also 
sometimes permits judges or juries to premise antitrust liability upon little more than 
uniform behavior among competitors, preceded by conversations implying that later 
uniformity might prove desirable .	.	.	.”); see also Stop & Shop Supermarket Co. v. Blue 
Cross & Blue Shield of R.I., 239 F. Supp. 2d 180, 187 (D.R.I. 2003) (“Proof of these plus 
factors may include evidence of meetings attended by the defendants followed shortly 
thereafter by parallel behavior that goes beyond what would be expected absent an 
agreement.”), aff’d, 373 F.3d 57 (1st Cir. 2004). 
 379. By failing to examine the evidence through an antitrust lens, the Ross court failed 
to understand the nature of agreements among competitors. For example, in 
characterizing the discussions among competitors to adopt class-action-barring arbitration 
clauses, the judge concluded that the “aggressive communications to various Issuing Banks 
strike this Court as aimed at persuasion rather than collusion.” Ross v. Am. Express Co., 
35 F. Supp. 3d 407, 453 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). Trying to persuade one’s competitors to raise 
price in direct meetings, followed by one’s competitors raising price, would constitute 
illegal price fixing. See United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948) 
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The Ross court, however, apparently interpreted the analogous 
facts more leniently because the alleged conspiracy involved the 
collusive imposition of arbitration clauses. Despite the fact that 
conspiracies to arbitrate impose serious anticompetitive harms380 and 
can strengthen an underlying price-fixing conspiracy,381 the court was 
relatively sympathetic to the goals of arbitration conspiracies.382 The 
heart of the problem is that courts view arbitration as fundamentally 
good and, consequently, interpret business behavior regarding 
arbitration clauses as innocent and innocuous.383 This appears to have 
distorted the Ross court’s interpretation of the facts. Whatever one’s 
view of arbitration, the facts clearly prove an agreement to make 
mandatory arbitration the industry norm, as the court itself found but 
did not appreciate.384 
V.  MOVING FORWARD 
The case study in Part IV illustrates in more specific detail the 
root of the problems identified in Part III: federal courts are so 
enamored with arbitration clauses that they fail to recognize the 
dangers and illegality of conspiracies to arbitrate. In misguided 
deference to the imagined virtues of mandatory arbitration, courts 
have misapplied equitable doctrines and antitrust law in a manner 
 
(“It is not necessary to find an express agreement in order to find a conspiracy. It is 
enough that a concert of action is contemplated and that the defendants conformed to the 
arrangement.”); cf. Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 227 (“Acceptance by competitors, 
without previous agreement, of an invitation to participate in a plan, the necessary 
consequence of which, if carried out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to 
establish an unlawful conspiracy under the Sherman Act.”). 
 380. See supra Section II.B. 
 381. See supra Section II.C. 
 382. One might argue that this exercise is unfair because arbitration clauses are legal, 
while price fixing is not. But that is a false comparison. Any firm—even a monopolist—can 
raise price legally so long as it does so unilaterally. It is agreements to raise price that 
violate antitrust law. Similarly, the legality of individually imposed arbitration clauses does 
not exonerate conspiracies to arbitrate. Nor should it prevent judges and juries from 
finding an agreement to impose arbitration clauses when competitors’ communications 
and actions indicate that conclusion. 
 383. The Ross court treated coordination regarding arbitration as inherently innocent. 
For example, when the Arbitration Coalition met in April 2001, one organizer 
“characterized the Arbitration Coalition as ‘the only organization uniquely devoted to 
protecting industry use of arbitration of consumer disputes.’” Ross, 35 F. Supp. 3d at 424. 
If a “Price-Raising Coalition” in an industry bragged that it was “the only organization 
uniquely devoted to raising price in an industry,” that evidence standing alone would be 
sufficiently damning to prove that simultaneous price increases had been the result of a 
Coalition-orchestrated agreement. But the Ross court treated the Arbitration Coalition’s 
proclamation as beyond reproach. 
 384. See supra notes 362–68 and accompanying text. 
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that rewards misconduct. As a consequence, courts embolden firms to 
conspire to use arbitration clauses to cloak their illegal activities from 
scrutiny because, after their customers are denied access to courts and 
to class-aggregating procedures, the victims of illegal conduct often 
have no financially feasible procedure to protect their rights. By 
collectively manipulating the terms in their arbitration clauses, law-
breaking firms may be able to evade legal liability altogether. 
Federal judges can begin to prevent these inequitable outcomes 
by taking several actions. First and foremost, when plaintiffs allege 
that the defendants conspired to impose arbitration clauses, a court 
must adjudicate these claims.385 Sending litigation involving 
arbitration conspiracies to an arbiter entails enforcing the self-same 
conspiracy. When federal judges compel arbitration in these cases, the 
plaintiffs’ alleged antitrust injury—being forced into the suboptimal, 
less-protective arbitration process—is inflicted by the very federal 
court tasked with remedying such injury. 
Federal judges should not interpret or apply arbitration clauses 
expansively. For example, courts should not allow defendants to 
apply pre-dispute arbitration clauses retroactively to cover their 
previous misconduct. To so do rewards and protects illegal activity. 
Neither should courts invoke equitable estoppel to expand the reach 
of arbitration clauses. Equitable considerations demand that antitrust 
defendants be denied the protections of their co-conspirators’ 
arbitration clauses. Accordingly, courts should stop turning equitable 
principles upside down by holding that illegal liaisons warrant 
estoppel against a conspiracy’s victims.386 
In addition, the Ross case study demonstrates that a judicial 
hearing alone is not sufficient to protect conspiracy victims. Judges 
considering allegations of arbitration conspiracies should not view the 
evidence and circumstances through a pro-arbitration lens. Even if 
mandatory arbitration were an effective and fair forum for consumer 
 
 385. One potential downside of requiring litigation of arbitration conspiracies is that 
antitrust plaintiffs may attempt to evade arbitration clauses by including allegations of a 
conspiracy to arbitrate in their complaints. This is not a problem for several reasons. First, 
the claims must survive a motion to dismiss. Second, requiring plaintiffs’ claims of a 
conspiracy to impose arbitration clauses be decided by judges, not arbitrators, is the 
correct result because Congress never intended consumer or antitrust claims to be subject 
to pre-dispute mandatory arbitration in the first place. Finally, this would not be a 
dramatic change so much as it is a return to form. All federal antitrust claims were decided 
by federal judges for almost the entire first century of the Sherman Act until the Supreme 
Court arbitrarily changed the rules in the 1980s, opening the door to antitrust arbitration. 
See supra notes 25–28, 34–45 and accompanying text. 
 386. See supra Section III.C. 
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claims—which it is not387—that should not affect the inquiry into 
whether the defendants agreed to impose arbitration clauses. Yet the 
Ross court found no agreement in part because of the court’s 
deference to arbitration. If courts better appreciated the downsides of 
mandatory arbitration, including the harms inflicted by conspiracies 
to arbitrate, they might be more appropriately suspicious of collective 
efforts by firms to prevent their customers from litigating in court. 
Finally, it bears noting that a return to the per se approach 
against conspiracies to arbitrate does not necessarily condemn all 
industry efforts to encourage arbitration. Antitrust law distinguishes 
between naked restraints and ancillary restraints.388 Naked 
agreements are more likely to be condemned as per se illegal.389 The 
facts of Ross resembled a naked agreement, in that the plaintiffs 
alleged that the competitors got together for the purpose and effect of 
collusively imposing arbitration clauses with class-action waivers on 
their customers. An industry’s conversion to mandatory arbitration 
need not be so naked, however. In some trades, a central body 
propounds a standardized contract that includes a mandatory 
arbitration provision.390 So long as members of the industry are free to 
accept or reject this contract and its individual terms, antitrust courts 
should not condemn a firm in a competitive market for unilaterally 
deciding to adopt a standardized contract with an arbitration clause. 
At the same time, judges should also be aware of the possibility 
of a hub-and-spoke conspiracy. Such a conspiracy could involve a 
trade organization or arbitration provider convincing competing firms 
to concurrently impose mandatory arbitration as a means of reducing 
their exposure to liability without alienating customers, who would 
 
 387. See supra Section I.B. 
 388. See Polk Bros. v. Forest City Enters., Inc., 776 F.2d 185, 188–89 (7th Cir. 1985) 
(“A court [in an antitrust case] must distinguish between ‘naked’ restraints, those in which 
the restriction on competition is unaccompanied by new production or products, and 
‘ancillary’ restraints, those that are part of a larger endeavor whose success they 
promote.”). See Mark A. Lemley & Christopher R. Leslie, Categorical Analysis in 
Antitrust Jurisprudence, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1207, 1221 (2008). 
 389. Id. 
 390. See, e.g., Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 
U.S. 468, 470, 470 n.1 (1989) (noting that standardized contract promulgated by American 
Institute of Architects contained arbitration clause). 
  One example of this scenario is the standard form contract created by the 
American Institute of Architects (“AIA”), which is “the ‘dominant’ provider of building 
design and construction documents[] and supplies a wide range of documents that are 
commonly used in the construction industry.” Patterson, supra note 129, at 352 (citing 
AIA website’s collection of “Document Synopses by Family”). The AIA standardized 
contract requires mandatory arbitration, as well as an altered statute of limitations and 
waiver of consequential damages. Id. at 353. 
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otherwise purchase from a seller that did not require mandatory 
arbitration.391 If a trade organization requires its members to impose 
arbitration clauses on its customers or employees, that comes closer 
to being a naked restraint.392 At a minimum, it looks less like truly 
independent decision-making. 
Determining whether an industry’s transition to market-wide 
mandatory arbitration resulted from a naked conspiracy, a hub-and-
spoke conspiracy, or independent decision-making will be a function 
of the facts of each individual case. In making this determination, 
however, courts should be alert to avoid the judicial mistakes 
highlighted in Section III.C and the Ross case study. In particular, 
judges should not allow the false premise of a federal policy favoring 
arbitration to cloud their judgment as to whether the defendants 
actually agreed to jointly impose arbitration clauses. 
In sum, if industry-wide mandatory arbitration is the result of a 
conspiracy among rival firms to collectively impose arbitration clauses 
on their customers, these firms have violated antitrust law. 
Consequently, federal courts should hold the co-conspirators 
accountable. 
CONCLUSION 
Private litigation is vital for the enforcement of antitrust laws.393 
Because private enforcement of antitrust laws can make price fixing 
unprofitable, price fixers would like to undermine private 
enforcement. One way to do this would be to dismantle or blunt the 
pro-plaintiff aspects of antitrust law. For example, price-fixing firms 
would like to ensure that antitrust damages are not trebled; that 
successful antitrust plaintiffs do not recover their attorneys’ fees and 
 
 391. See United States v. Apple, Inc., 791 F.3d 290, 314 (2d Cir. 2015) (explaining that 
“courts have long recognized the existence of ‘hub-and-spoke’ conspiracies in which an 
entity at one level of the market structure, the ‘hub,’ coordinates an agreement among 
competitors at a different level, the ‘spokes’”). 
 392. Courts fail to appreciate the significance of such conspiracies to arbitrate. See, e.g., 
Drayer v. Krasner, 572 F.2d 348, 354 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Compelling all member firms to 
include an arbitration clause in contracts with registered representatives does not inhibit 
the freedom of any firm in competing for business or of any investor in seeking the firm 
that will give him the best and cheapest service.”). 
 393. Joshua P. Davis & Robert H. Lande, Defying Conventional Wisdom: The Case for 
Private Antitrust Enforcement, 48 GA. L. REV. 1, 26 (2013). This is particularly true with 
respect to arbitration conspiracies. In theory, government officials could litigate in court 
against alleged members of a conspiracy to arbitrate. Buffon & Wolson, supra note 51, at 
34 (“Similarly, an arbitration provision will not prevent a government enforcement action, 
because the government will not be a party to the agreement.”). In the current political 
climate, this seems unlikely. 
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costs; that antitrust plaintiffs cannot receive injunctive relief; that 
antitrust statutes of limitation are truncated; and that victims of 
antitrust violations cannot pursue class actions to hold antitrust 
violators accountable. Price fixers cannot achieve these goals directly. 
So, they attempt to achieve them indirectly through mandatory 
arbitration. Arbitration clauses do not simply shift adjudication of 
antitrust claims from public courts to private forums; instead, firms 
use these clauses to attempt to dismantle the pro-plaintiff aspects of 
antitrust law. 
When firms in an industry each unilaterally impose mandatory 
arbitration clauses on their customers, that is a tragedy; when firms in 
an industry agree with each other to impose mandatory arbitration 
clauses on their customers, that is an antitrust law violation. How did 
we go from a world in which conspiracies to arbitrate were per se 
illegal to our current one in which federal courts hold that it is 
perfectly legal for competitors to agree to make arbitration the 
industry standard? The answer has less to do with a failure of 
antitrust law than a breakdown of sensible arbitration jurisprudence. 
Courts err when they invoke the so-called federal policy in favor of 
arbitration as the justification for preventing consumers from 
litigating claims of conspiracy to arbitrate. Congress never created 
such a federal policy. Congress never intended consumer claims to be 
forced into arbitration. It never intended antitrust claims, let alone 
conspiracy-to-arbitrate claims, to be subject to mandatory arbitration. 
The effects of the false belief in a federal policy favoring 
arbitration are numerous. First, it leads courts to divert conspiracy-to-
arbitrate claims from court to arbitration, where valid claims are less 
likely to succeed. Second, it leads to the misapplication of equitable 
estoppel principles in order to allow non-signatories to compel 
arbitration. Third, it allows lawbreakers to retroactively prevent their 
victims from suing in court. And, fourth, as shown by the Ross case 
study, it makes it less likely for courts to find an agreement even 
when one exists. 
Courts compound their mistakes by misapplying ancillary legal 
doctrines, such as equitable estoppel. Congress certainly never 
intended non-signatories to be able to enforce their co-conspirators’ 
arbitration clauses against victims of illegal price fixing. Some courts 
have fetishized arbitration clauses to the point that they are ignoring 
both the legislative history of the FAA and the practical 
consequences of their pro-arbitration decisions. The solution is as 
simple as judges correctly reading the language and legislative history 
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of the FAA and as difficult as having the federal judiciary admit that 
they have been misapplying these texts for over three decades. 
The stakes are high. Although businesses tout arbitration as an 
efficient way to resolve disputes, firms have wielded arbitration 
clauses as a weapon to effectively prevent consumers from bringing 
any legal claims against businesses. They structure their arbitration 
clauses to circumvent both pro-consumer laws and the protections of 
judicial procedures designed to create a level playing field upon which 
to resolve disputes. As often written, mandatory arbitration clauses 
are anti-consumer: they deprive consumers of any meaningful means 
to remedy legal wrongs, whether that be injuries from unsafe 
products, deceptive overcharges, or paying an illegally fixed price. 
When competitors conspire to impose arbitration clauses on their 
customers, the firms violate antitrust law. Federal courts should hold 
the conspirators accountable. While an industry-wide norm of 
mandatory arbitration does not alone violate section 1 of the 
Sherman Antitrust Act, when competing firms agree among 
themselves to adopt and pursue that norm, that constitutes a 
conspiracy for antitrust purposes. Courts should never invoke any so-
called federal policy favoring arbitration to negate finding an 
agreement when one exists. 
